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Abstract 
 
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is characterised by the presence of intrusive 
and upsetting mental imagery of past traumatic events (American Psychiatric 
Association [APA], 2013). Research has begun to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
Imagery Rescripting (ImRs) (Arntz & Weertman, 1999; Smucker, Dancu, Foa, & 
Niederee, 1995) in the treatment of PTSD. However, despite this apparent 
effectiveness, there is currently a lack of research into the mechanisms of action 
underlying the technique and factors that moderate its effectiveness (Arntz, 2012). In 
addition, no qualitative studies have examined ImRs specifically. The aims of this 
study therefore were to explore individuals’ experience of ImRs in their treatment for 
PTSD, including factors that influenced its effectiveness, and consider potential 
mechanisms of action, relative to what is proposed by existing theory. Ten semi-
structured interviews were conducted with participants from a London-based trauma 
service, who had experienced ImRs in their treatment for PTSD. The interviews were 
analysed using a Grounded Theory (GT) approach (Charmaz, 2014), which generated 
a theoretical model of ImRs. This model was based upon the nine theoretical codes 
and 34 focused codes that emerged from the data. The results suggested potential 
mechanisms of action to be change to memory representations, change to felt sense 
and change to metacognitive insight and self-efficacy. It was not possible to clearly 
determine the underlying memory change, however the majority of participants 
experienced a sense of two memories following ImRs, with some participants 
experiencing something closer to change to the original traumatic memory. Multiple 
effectiveness factors were evident, including the theoretical codes of ‘factors 
preceding ImRs’, ‘individual differences’, ‘the importance of the therapeutic 
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structure’, ‘the importance of the therapist’, ‘creating an effective rescript’, ‘long-term 
accessibility of the rescript’ and ‘enhancing on-going use of ImRs’. The study’s 
strengths, limitations, clinical implications and suggestions for future research were 
also discussed. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“ImRs, although a powerful technique, seems to be a technique in need of a theory” 
(Arntz, 2012, p.200) 
 
Overview 
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is characterised by the presence of intrusive 
and upsetting mental imagery of past traumatic events (American Psychiatric 
Association [APA], 2013). Due to the prominence of intrusive images in PTSD and 
the link between imagery and emotion (Holmes & Matthews, 2005; Holmes, 
Mathews, Mackintosh, & Dalgleish, 2008) it is of no surprise that imagery techniques 
are currently being utilised therapeutically to alleviate distress. Research has begun to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of Imagery Rescripting (ImRs) (Arntz & Weertman, 
1999; Smucker, Dancu, Foa, & Niederee, 1995) in the treatment of PTSD. Despite 
this apparent effectiveness, there is currently a lack of research into the mechanisms 
of action underlying the technique and the factors that moderate its effectiveness 
(Arntz, 2012). The present study therefore aimed to address this by interviewing 
participants to explore their experience of the ImRs technique as part of treatment for 
PTSD, including what made it more or less effective, and consider potential 
mechanisms of action relative to what is proposed by existing theory. A resulting 
model is presented, aiming to increase theoretical understanding of ImRs, to then 
increase clinical effectiveness. 	 
 
 
 
	 15	
Mental Imagery 
Mental images can be defined as “contents of consciousness that possess sensory 
qualities as opposed to those that are purely verbal or abstract” (Hackmann, 1998, 
p.301). These mental images are not purely visual and can also include auditory, 
olfactory, gustatory, touch and movement sensory qualities (Kosslyn, 1994). This can 
be thought of as “seeing with the mind's eye or hearing with the mind's ear” (Kosslyn, 
Ganis, & Thompson, 2001, p.635). Martin and Williams (1990) suggested that mental 
images are experienced on a continuum, from real events, important for 
autobiographical memory functioning and recollection (Conway, 2001), to 
hypothetical events.  
 
Mental images and emotion. The impact of mental imagery on emotions has 
long been recognised but only more recently demonstrated empirically. Research has 
shown a causal effect of mental imagery on emotions, stronger than that caused by 
verbal stimuli, in positive and negative directions (Holmes & Matthews, 2005; 
Holmes et al., 2008). Holmes and Mathews (2010) suggested three potential 
mechanisms for the impact of mental imagery on emotions. Firstly, mental imagery 
directly influences emotional systems in the brain, resulting in emotional reactions 
similar to actual stimuli (Lang, 1979). This is a possible evolutionary mechanism, 
with basic emotion systems evolving early to respond to sensory information from the 
environment, therefore responding to the sensory nature of mental images too 
(Holmes & Mathews, 2010; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). Secondly, an overlap in 
processes between mental imagery and perception exists, demonstrated by 
competition for cognitive resources between the two in the same sensory modality 
(Baddeley & Andrade, 2000; Segal & Fusella, 1969). Neuro-imaging research has 
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demonstrated that the same areas of the brain are active when perceiving and 
imagining, including for emotional stimuli (Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004; 
Herholz, Halpern, & Zatorre, 2012; Kim et al., 2007). Thirdly, mental images connect 
with emotional memories. Mental images are present when remembering (Brewer, 
1996) and are prominent in autobiographical memory (Conway, 2001). Therefore, if 
creating mental images draws on autobiographical memory, the image is likely to 
include the emotion associated with the memory (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  
 
Intrusive mental images. Mental images become intrusive when they “spring 
to mind unbidden, against a person’s will” (Holmes & Mathews, 2010, p.357). 
Intrusive mental images occur in both non-clinical and clinical populations and can be 
pleasurable or cause distress (Rusch, Grunert, Mendelsohn, & Smucker, 2000). While 
intrusive mental imagery is prominent in many psychopathologies (Brewin, Gregory, 
Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; Holmes & Mathews, 2010), it is most notably linked with 
PTSD. Intrusive mental images are a hallmark symptom of PTSD and often what 
prompt people to seek treatment (Holmes, Grey, & Young, 2005). 
 
PTSD 
PTSD is a reaction to exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury or sexual 
violation. Symptoms include: re-experiencing of the event (e.g., intrusive memories, 
nightmares and/or flashbacks) resulting in physiological reactivity and psychological 
distress, avoidance of internal or external stimuli which could serve as reminders, 
negative alterations in cognition and mood, and alterations in arousal and reactivity 
(APA, 2013). 
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Intrusive mental images in PTSD. These intrusive mental images range from 
sensory fragments of the traumatic event being re-experienced (Ehlers et al., 2002; 
Ehlers & Steil, 1995) to full dissociative flashbacks. These intrusions are 
characterised by a sense of ‘nowness’ (APA, 2013; Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckens, & 
Clark, 2004), which is linked to a sense of current threat (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
Research has suggested that while re-experiencing involves multiple senses, visual 
images are the most common (Ehlers et al., 2002; Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Hackmann et 
al., 2004; Brewin & Holmes, 2003). It has been suggested that distress associated with 
intrusions, the sense of ‘nowness’ and a lack of context predict PTSD severity 
(Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005). Intrusive mental images maintain PTSD 
and impact upon behaviour and physiology (Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, & Kosslyn, 
2015).  
 
Generally, intrusive mental images in PTSD relate to the ‘hotspots’ of the trauma 
memory, the subjectively worst and most emotional moments for the individual 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Holmes et al., 2005; Richards & Lovell, 1999). Cognitions in 
‘hotspots’ often relate to threat to physical integrity, or more commonly threat to 
sense of self (Holmes et al., 2005). While fear is a predominant emotion, other 
emotions are prominent as well, such as anger, sadness and shame (Grey & Holmes, 
2008; Grey, Holmes, & Brewin, 2001; Holmes et al., 2005). Intrusive mental images 
can also be of moments just before the trauma occurred or the meaning worsened, that 
is, ‘warning signals’, adaptive for future safety (Ehlers et al., 2002). Hackmann 
(2011) suggested that intrusions could also be imagined events, recalled as happening 
during or following the trauma.  
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Treatment for PTSD. 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) guidelines (2005). The 
current NICE guidelines recommend trauma-focused CBT (TF-CBT) or eye 
movement desensitisation and reprocessing (EMDR) therapies as treatment for PTSD. 
 
Exposure therapy (ET). Early models of PTSD treatment were largely 
behavioural in approach. They suggested that during the traumatic event, previously 
neutral stimuli become primed to elicit fear through classical conditioning, resulting 
in avoidance (Keane, Zimering, & Caddell, 1985). Treatment therefore emphasised 
the importance of exposure to the trauma memory and subsequent reduction of the 
conditioned emotional response to trauma-related cues in order to promote extinction 
(Mowrer, 1960). To achieve this, the traumatic memory is ‘re-lived’, either in-vivo, or 
more commonly, through imaginal exposure (IE). During IE the individual vividly 
imagines the traumatic event, with the aim of habituation and extinction of the fear 
response (Jaycox & Foa, 1996). The fear network theory (Lang, 1977; 1979) suggests 
that IE activates the fear network and incorporates new information, such as fear 
habituation. ET therefore could be effective due to facilitating complete emotional 
processing of the event (Foa & Kozack, 1986; Grey, Young, & Holmes, 2002). 
 
Despite the effectiveness of ET, there appear to be limitations in utilising this 
approach in isolation. ET has been found to result in higher levels of dropout from 
therapy, than when combined with other techniques (Arntz, Tiesema, & Kindt, 2007). 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that ET is most effective when the predominant 
emotion is fear or anxiety (Arntz et al., 2007; Jaycox & Foa, 1996; Smucker & 
Dancu, 2005). Indeed, exposure without considering emotions such as shame or guilt 
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could be detrimental (Lee, Scragg, & Turner, 2001). Ehlers, Clark, Hackmann, 
McManus, and Fennell (2005) demonstrated that a largely cognitive intervention 
resulted in highly significant improvement in PTSD symptoms, suggesting exposure 
alone might not be the effective technique. 
 
 TF-CBT. TF-CBT, developed after ET, incorporated additional cognitive 
techniques. Cognitive models of PTSD, such as Ehlers and Clark’s (2000), suggest 
that the nature of the trauma memory and negative appraisals lead to a sense of 
current threat, maintained by behavioural and cognitive strategies intended to control 
the sense of threat and symptoms. Therefore, verbal cognitive restructuring 
techniques are used to work with emotions and cognitions that occurred during and 
following the trauma, with Grey et al. (2002) highlighting the importance of 
addressing peri-traumatic appraisals. This can be particularly effective in addressing 
emotions in addition to fear and anxiety (Grey et al., 2002; Grunert, Smucker, Weis, 
& Rusch, 2003; Grunert, Weis, Smucker, & Christianson, 2007). Imagery techniques 
have also been incorporated into cognitive treatment for PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; 
Ehlers et al., 2005; Hackmann, 2011). 
 
Memory consolidation and re-consolidation.  
Memory consolidation. A ‘cognitive vaccine’ to interrupt memory 
consolidation has recently been suggested (Holmes, James, Coode-Bate, & Deeprose, 
2009, p.1), which could be pivotal in future PTSD treatment. Simplistically, memory 
consolidation is the process of a new ‘labile’ memory undergoing stabilisation into 
long-term storage (Dudai, 2004; Nader, Schafe, & LeDoux, 2000). Analogue studies 
have demonstrated that visuo-spatial tasks completed peri-traumatically reduce 
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intrusive mental images (Baddeley & Arendale, 2000; Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessey, 
2004; Stuart, Holmes & Brewin, 2006). Importantly for PTSD treatment, completing 
a visuospatial task within a four-hour window after watching a traumatic film resulted 
in reduced flashbacks, leaving deliberate memory recall intact (Holmes et al., 2009; 
Holmes, James, Kilford, & Deeprose, 2010). Holmes et al. (2009) suggested the 
effectiveness may be due to the limited resources of working memory and therefore 
visuo-spatial tasks competing for resources with visual images, disturbing memory 
consolidation, and subsequently decreasing later flashbacks (Andrade, Kavanagh, & 
Baddeley, 1997; Holmes et al., 2004; Kavanagh, Freese, Andrade, & May, 2001; 
Hout, Muris, Salemink, & Kindt, 2001). The importance of resources being from the 
same modality is demonstrated by verbal tasks not reducing flashbacks post trauma 
and even increasing them (Bourne, Frasquilho, Roth, & Holmes, 2010; Holmes et al., 
2010).  
 
  Memory re-consolidation. It may not be practically possible to intervene 
therapeutically before traumatic memories are consolidated. In addition, NICE 
guidelines (2005) suggest that intervention shortly after a traumatic event should not 
be offered (Mayou, Ehlers, & Hobbs, 2000; McNally, Bryant, & Ehlers, 2003), 
although this has been called into question (Dyregrov & Regel, 2012). It is important 
therefore to consider memory re-consolidation some time after a traumatic event. 
 
It was initially suggested that once a memory was formed, it was stable and its 
content largely remained unchanged, as it had moved from the hippocampus to the 
neo-cortex (McGaugh, 2000; Squire & Alvarez, 1995; Squire & Davis, 1981). An 
alternative theory of consolidation is proposed by multiple trace theory (MTT) (Nadel 
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& Moscovitch, 1997; Moscovitch & Nadel 1999). MTT suggested that every time a 
memory is retrieved a new memory trace is created in the hippocampus (Nadel, 
Samsonovich, Ryan, & Moscovitch, 2000). However, Lane et al. (2015) suggested 
that MTT does not only propose that a new memory trace is created but that the 
original memory trace becomes ‘labile’ enabling it to be amended or access disrupted, 
which could be viewed as reconsolidation (however see also Nader et al., 2000). 
Much research has challenged the stability of memory (Dudai, 2006). Lewis (1979) 
suggested a division of active memory (new and reactivated) and inactive 
(consolidated and not reactivated). Schiller and Phelps (2011) stated that interfering 
with reconsolidation by pharmacological or behavioural means either blocks or alters 
re-storage of memory. 
 
Animal studies have demonstrated that fear memories can be reconsolidated (Dudai, 
2009; Nader et al., 2000; Tronson & Taylor, 2007). Studies with humans have found 
that administering propranolol (which regulates long-term memory storage) after re-
activating a traumatic memory reduces physiological responses, weakening the fear 
response, possibly by blocking reconsolidation (Brunet et al., 2008; 2011; Kindt, 
Soeter, & Vervliet, 2009). However it has been suggested that Kindt et al. (2009) did 
not accurately target the reconsolidation mechanism (Schiller & Phelps, 2011). 
Importantly, Schiller et al. (2010) used a non-pharmacological method to alter (rather 
than block) memory. They demonstrated that through extinction training, old fearful 
memories can be updated during a reconsolidation window with new non-fearful 
information, resulting in fear responses no longer being demonstrated. They found 
this to be the case for the target memory only and that this effect was evident a year 
later. Agren et al. (2012) found that extinction occurring in the reconsolidation 
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window erased fear traces in the amygdala and weakened the connection in fear 
circuits. However, some studies have not demonstrated comparable results (Golkar, 
Bellander, Olsson, & Ohman, 2012; Kindt & Soeter, 2013). 
 
Reconsolidation differs to extinction, where it has been proposed that the individual 
learns that the conditioned stimulus (CS) does not predict the unconditioned stimulus 
(US), by creating a safe memory that competes with the original. This safe memory 
then inhibits, rather than erases, the fearful memory (Bouton, 2002). This means that 
the CS-US association remains stored in memory and could be reinstated in a 
different context (Maren, 2011; Schiller et al., 2010), perhaps explaining PTSD 
relapse (Debiec, Bush, & Ledoux, 2011). Clearly if treatment for PTSD could 
reconsolidate memories, rather than create alternatives, this would have far reaching 
effects for clinical effectiveness. However, Brewin (2015) suggested that it is 
premature to suggest reconsolidation can explain therapeutic change and that retrieval 
competition accounts (i.e., where a new memory is retrieved over the original 
traumatic memory) are better placed to explain this. 
 
ImRs 
Imagery techniques have been utilised therapeutically for thousands of years 
(Edwards, 2007; 2011) and their importance has been recognised since the advent of 
cognitive therapy (Beck, 1979), particularly when working with traumatic memories 
(Smucker, 1997). A specific imagery technique, ImRs (Arntz & Weertman, 1999; 
Smucker et al., 1995), is increasingly being used by therapists to treat PTSD (Arntz, 
2012). Dibbetts and Arntz (2015) state, “during ImRs a person is instructed to 
mentally relive a memory or fantasy of an aversive experience and, next, to change 
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the course of events in a more desired direction” (p.1).  
 
ImRs involves the traumatic memory being activated by the individual giving a verbal 
description of the image/memory, including events, sensory and perceptual 
experiences, emotions, cognitions, and needs (Arntz, 2011). Individuals are then 
guided by their therapist to imagine their needs met and a desired outcome being 
achieved in the image (Hackmann, 1998). The rescript can involve correcting a 
distorted image, using compassion, being reassured, reducing threat perceptions and 
overcoming perpetrators (Arntz, 2012; Hackmann, 2011). It has been suggested that 
the rescript can be prepared collaboratively prior to imagining (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), 
be created ‘online’ based on needs and wishes present during imagining (Arntz, 
2012), or the therapist can decide. In contrast to cognitive techniques, ImRs rarely 
involves verbally challenging thoughts associated with the trauma (Brewin et al., 
2009). 
 
Pre-emptive rescripting. It is not yet clear when the rescript should begin, 
that is, when the sequence of events should be changed. It has been suggested that 
rescripting could pre-empt the traumatic event in memory, as it is not necessary to 
imagine the whole aversive event (Arntz & Weertman, 1999; Krakow & Zadra, 
2006). Recent research with refugees with complex trauma histories demonstrates that 
rescripting is effective when begun before the worst part of the traumatic event, but 
late enough to trigger an arousing expectation (Arntz, Sofi, & Breukelen, 2013), in 
line with the ‘warning signal’ hypothesis (Ehlers et al., 2002). In contrast, treatment 
for PTSD has long emphasised the importance of including the most aversive scenes 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Furthermore, Dibbets and Arntz (2015) recently conducted an 
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analogue study demonstrating that including the most aversive scenes in ImRs 
resulted in the greatest reduction in the frequency and vividness of intrusive mental 
images. 
 
Efficacy of ImRs. 
Efficacy transdiagnostically. Research is accumulating that demonstrates the 
effectiveness of ImRs with a wide range of presenting issues (Arntz, 2012). The 
technique has been used effectively to modify core schemas in personality disorders 
(PD), using a slightly different approach to that for intrusive images in PTSD, with 
three stages of varying child and adult perspectives (Arntz, 2011; Arntz & Weertman, 
1999; Weertman & Arntz, 2007). Holmes, Arntz, and Smucker (2007) referred to this 
as a ‘type b’ technique - a new positive image is constructed where there is not 
necessarily an underlying distressing negative image.  
 
ImRs has also been found to be effective for depression (Brewin et al., 2009; 
Wheatley et al., 2007), social phobia (Frets, Kevenaar, & van der Heiden, 2014; Wild, 
Hackmann, & Clark, 2007; 2008), bulimia nervosa (Cooper, Todd, & Turner, 2007; 
Ohanian, 2002), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Veale, Page, Woodward, & 
Salkovskis, 2015), simple phobia (Hunt et al., 2006), nightmares (Krakow & Zadra, 
2006) and PTSD (Arntz, 2012). Holmes et al. (2007) referred to this as a ‘type a’ 
technique - a pre-existing negative mental image is transformed into a more benign 
image. 
 
Efficacy with PTSD. It is evident that ImRs (largely ‘type a’ techniques for 
adult trauma) is particularly relevant to PTSD treatment due to the prominence of 
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intrusive mental images and memories (Arntz, 2012). Grunert et al. (2007) examined 
23 participants with PTSD due to industrial accidents who had not improved with ET 
alone. Following an ImRs and cognitive restructuring intervention, 18 out of 23 
participants were in recovery. However, this research did not include a second 
treatment group for comparison. Arntz et al. (2007) conducted a randomised control 
trial with 71 participants diagnosed with PTSD to compare IE, IE and ImRs, and 
waiting list. They found that IE, and IE and ImRs combined, were of equal 
effectiveness in reducing PTSD symptoms. However, IE and ImRs combined were 
more effective for emotions such as anger, hostility and guilt. Kindt, Buck, Arntz, and 
Soeter (2007) also examined the effects of IE and ImRs with 25 participants with 
PTSD. The results of this study largely focused on the change from perceptual to 
conceptual coding of traumatic memories. However, it also demonstrated that IE and 
ImRs combined was an effective treatment. Unfortunately, the effects of ImRs alone 
could not be determined. 
 
However, the stand-alone effectiveness of the ImRs technique for PTSD has also been 
demonstrated. Smucker et al. (1995) showed that ImRs reduces PTSD symptoms in 
survivors of childhood sexual abuse, although this did include some exposure to the 
traumatic memory. More recent research has demonstrated ImRs to be effective in 
refugees with ‘complicated’ PTSD, using a multiple base-line case series design, with 
the re-script beginning just before the worst moment of the trauma occurred, making 
the technique more tolerable (Arntz et al., 2013). ‘Pre-emptive’ ImRs has also been 
found to be an effective stand-alone intervention for PTSD due to childhood sexual 
and/or physical abuse (Raabe, Ehring, Marquenie, Olff, & Kindt, 2015). Interestingly, 
Hagenaars and Arntz (2012) conducted an analogue study that demonstrated ImRs to 
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be effective soon after viewing a traumatic film in reducing the number of intrusive 
mental images and negative cognitions, presumably by interrupting memory 
consolidation. 
 
Theories of PTSD: Cause and Maintenance of Intrusive Mental Images 
Multiple theories and models have been proposed to explain PTSD. It is important to 
understand what these theories suggest regarding the cause and maintenance of 
intrusive mental images, and PTSD treatment, to examine possible mechanisms of 
action of ImRs. Brewin and Holmes (2003) suggested that early theories of PTSD 
could be divided into: conditioning, information-processing and social-cognitive 
theories. 
 
Early theories. 
Conditioning theories. These focus on learned associations and avoidance 
behaviour (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). Early explanations of PTSD proposed that 
Mowrer’s (1960) learning theory, including classical and instrumental learning, could 
explain PTSD. This theory suggests that a neutral stimulus (NS) (e.g., a lift) is paired 
with an US (e.g., an assault) and the neutral stimulus then acts as a predictive CS for 
the US, resulting in a conditioned response (CR) (e.g., fear). During a traumatic event, 
multiple stimuli could be conditioned to provoke the CR and even stimuli not present 
at the time of trauma, due to stimulus generalisation and higher order conditioning 
(Keane, Zimmerling, & Caddell, 1985). Furthermore, operant conditioning suggests 
that avoidance of the CS is strengthened through negative reinforcement (fear 
reduction), preventing weakening of the association between the CS and CR 
(Gonzalez-Prendes & Resko, 2012). Research has also found that a CR can be created 
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using imagery, with the CS or US not actually present (Dadds, Bovbjerg, Redd, & 
Cutmore, 1997) and is even a possibility with both the CS and US being imagined 
(Dibbets, Poort, & Arntz, 2012).  
 
Information-processing theories. These focus on the encoding, storage and 
retrieval of traumatic events and stimuli and responses, and less on the wider context 
(Brewin & Holmes, 2003). They suggest that traumatic memories are incompletely 
processed and stored differently in memory to non-traumatic autobiographical 
memories, resulting in PTSD. For example, Lang (1977; 1979) reformulated 
conditioning theories and suggested a fear network model. This provides a bio-
informational understanding of fear, whereby traumatic events are represented in 
memory as interconnections between ‘nodes’ in an associative network. This network 
includes: perceptual information about the feared stimulus; verbal, physiological and 
behavioural responses; and the meaning of the event. This theory combines affect and 
cognition and suggests that a fear memory is accessed when a critical amount of 
information is presented that matches what is in the network, prompting escape or 
avoidance behaviour. Ji, Heyes, MacLeod, and Holmes (2016) highlighted how 
Lang’s theory (1977; 1979) suggests that an imagined and an actual emotional 
stimulus might activate an overlapping network, resulting in similar emotional 
responses. 
 
Social-cognitive theories. These focus on how a traumatic event violates an 
individual’s previously held beliefs about themselves, the world and others, and their 
subsequent attempts to reconcile this (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). For example, the 
psycho-dynamically influenced stress response theory (Horowitz, 1976; 1986) 
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suggests that following trauma, ‘outcry’ occurs, followed by attempts to assimilate 
and reconcile what has happened with previously held beliefs. If the event cannot be 
reconciled, reminders are avoided, and memories come to mind unbidden. The theory 
of shattered assumptions (Janoff-Bulman, 1992) suggests that three assumptions are 
particularly relevant to trauma: the world is benevolent, the world is meaningful and 
the self is worthy. If the trauma is not reflected upon, these assumptions are unable to 
be updated, resulting in continued distress.  
 
Current theories. There are three theories of PTSD that developed from 
earlier theories and are now prominent in the literature: emotional processing theory 
(Foa & Kozack, 1986; Foa, Steketee, & Rothbaum, 1989), dual representation theory 
(Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Brewin et al., 2010) and Ehlers and Clark’s 
(2000) cognitive model (Brewin & Holmes, 2003).  
 
Emotional processing theory (Foa & Kozack, 1986; Foa et al., 1989). 
Emotional processing theory built upon Lang’s (1977; 1979) information-processing 
fear network theory. Foa and Kozack (1985; 1986) suggested that fear becomes 
pathological when the memory network includes excessive response elements, is 
resistant to change, the associations are not realistic and it includes high negative 
emotion. Fear networks in PTSD include information about danger, physiological 
preparation for escape and cognitions such as ‘the world is totally dangerous’ and ‘the 
self is totally incompetent’ (Foa & Riggs, 1993; Foa & Rothbaum, 1998). Foa et al. 
(1989) suggested that the connections between nodes in the fear network are strong, 
over-inclusive and have a low threshold for activation. This results in multiple stimuli 
activating the network, meaning an individual is regularly in a state of high arousal, 
	 29	
regularly re-experiences the trauma and is regularly avoidant. Importantly, this 
avoidance prevents adequate emotional processing of the traumatic event and 
modification of memory structures that underlie emotions (Foa & Kozack, 1986).  
 
Dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 1996; Brewin, et al., 2010). The 
emotional processing theory (Foa & Kozack, 1986; Foa et al., 1989) was later 
challenged by the dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 1996; Brewin et al., 
2010). This theory suggested that two memory systems operate in parallel: 1) the 
verbally accessible memory system (VAM) and 2) the situationally accessible 
memory system (SAM) (Brewin et al., 1996). Subsequently, Brewin et al. (2010) 
revised this by suggesting that VAMs be referred to as contextual ‘C-memory/C-reps’ 
and SAMs as sensation based ‘S-memory/S-reps’. Brewin et al. (2010) proposed that 
C-reps are comprised of autobiographical content that is spatially and temporally 
contextualised, updated over time, under conscious control, voluntarily retrieved and 
transferred to long-term memory. C-reps are supported by the prefrontal and medial 
temporal areas of the brain, including the hippocampus and para-hippocampus. In 
contrast, S-reps are comprised of content that is largely sensory and perceptual, not 
contextualised, not updated over time, involuntarily retrieved and not transferred to 
long-term memory. S-reps are supported by subcortical brain structures, such as the 
amygdala and the insula. Uncontextualised S-reps form the basis of flashbacks and 
nightmares in PTSD. 
 
Brewin et al. (2010) proposed that in non-traumatic memory, an S-rep is associated 
with the appropriate C-rep in the medial temporal lobe, via the precencus, even for 
stressful situations. This results in context being provided for the S-
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integrated into autobiographical memory, resulting in the memory not being re-
experienced, as if it is happening in the ‘here and now’. In addition, control can be 
exerted over the S-rep from the prefrontal cortex, due to an association having been 
made. In contrast, in traumatic memory, Brewin et al. (2010) suggested that intrusions 
occur due to the creation of an S-rep from a traumatic event without an association 
being made to a corresponding C-rep. They suggested that extreme stress levels 
during the trauma result in narrowing of attention and decrease in hippocampal 
functioning, leading to problems in creating C-reps. In addition, interruptions to 
encoding, such as dissociation, at the time of the trauma also disrupts C-rep 
formation. Therefore, strong S-reps and weaker C-reps exist, with impaired 
associations between the two. Furthermore, C-reps cannot exert top-down control 
over the S-reps, resulting in them being triggered unexpectedly. Brewin et al. (2010) 
suggested that behavioural and cognitive avoidance result in maintaining the 
incomplete nature of the C-rep.  
 
Retrieval competition hypothesis (Brewin, 2006). Brewin’s (2006) retrieval 
competition hypothesis suggests that emotions and behaviours are under the control of 
alternative memory representations which are in retrieval competition with each other. 
In relation to Brewin et al.’s (2010) theory, retrieval competition suggests that when 
exposed to cues of the traumatic event the non-contextualised stronger S-rep prevails 
in retrieval competition over the C-rep, resulting in the traumatic memory being re-
experienced. 
 
Cognitive model (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Ehlers and Clark (2000) later 
developed a cognitive model of PTSD. They suggested that persistent PTSD occurs 
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when individuals process the traumatic event in a way that leads to a sense of serious 
current threat. Current threat can be conceptualised as external (e.g., the world is a 
more dangerous place) or internal (e.g., threat to one’s view of oneself). This sense of 
threat occurs due to three factors: negative appraisals of the trauma (e.g., I attract 
disaster), negative appraisals of its sequelae (e.g., I cannot rely on other people) and 
autobiographical memory disturbance. Maladaptive behavioural and cognitive 
strategies are then adopted in an attempt to control the perceived threat and 
symptoms. Ehlers and Clark (2000) also proposed two routes to retrieving 
autobiographical information. Firstly, non-traumatic memories are retrieved through 
higher-order meaning based processes, from an organised knowledge base (Conway 
& Pleydell-Pearce, 1997). Secondly, traumatic memories are retrieved due to being 
triggered by stimuli associated with the traumatic event, as they are poorly elaborated 
and contextualised and not assimilated with other autobiographical memories. They 
suggested that these characteristics of traumatic memories explain intrusions being 
unintentionally recalled, the ‘here and now’ quality and the lack of links to 
subsequent information. 
 
The cognitive model also draws on learning theory (Mowrer, 1960; Watson & 
Rayner, 1920) suggesting that stimulus-stimulus and stimulus-response associations 
for traumatic events are stronger than for non-traumatic events, resulting in the 
traumatic memory being more easily triggered. Ehlers and Clark (2000) suggested 
that cues present at the time of the trauma therefore become predictors of imminent 
danger. These cues (CS) or ‘warning signals’ will therefore result in fear (CR) even 
when there is no current threat to the individual (Ehlers et al., 2002). They also 
suggested that data-driven/perceptual processing at the time of the trauma leads to 
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strong perceptual priming and a memory that is hard to intentionally retrieve, as it has 
not been processed conceptually and given a context (Roediger, 1990; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1993). 
 
Implications for treatment. Early conditioning theories (Mowrer, 1960) 
suggest that repeated exposure to the traumatic memory should extinguish fear 
associations. This could occur through fear habituation and/or the generation of a 
new, safe memory, which inhibits the fearful memory (Bouton, 2002; Rescorla, 
2001). However, this is not always effective, as conditioned fear responses can return 
over time and are context dependent (Bouton, 1993; Maren, 2011; Schiller et al., 
2010).  
 
Emotional processing theory (Foa & Kozack, 1986; Foa, et al., 1989) suggests that, to 
reduce fear, strong associations in the fear network must be weakened by activating 
the network with matching information, and incorporating new, corrective 
information, that is incompatible with the fear structure (e.g., repeated exposure to 
going out alone and not being attacked) (Foa & Kozack, 1986). This new information 
could be a change in association due to conditioning, physiological habituation, 
and/or change in emotions (Foa & Kozack, 1986). Foa and Kozack (1986) suggested 
that the change in the fear structure can be viewed as emotional processing (Rachman, 
1980), that is, “the modification of memory structures that underlie emotions” (p.20). 
 
The revised dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 2010) suggests that exposure to 
intrusive images enables S-reps to be processed and contextualised to create a 
coherent account of the traumatic event. This occurs by transferring parts of S-reps 
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into more elaborated C-reps. An association between S-reps and C-reps is also 
created, via the posterior parietal and retrosplenial cortices, so that S-reps are 
provided context by the hippocampus. The new contextualised C-reps then win 
retrieval competition and distress is decreased (Brewin et al., 2010). Therefore, the 
retrieval competition hypothesis suggests that the original traumatic memory remains 
intact and unchanged, however recovery occurs when new positive representations are 
more accessible and an individual retrieves these, rather than the traumatic 
representation (Brewin, 2006; Brewin et al., 2010; Brewin & Holmes, 2003).  
 
The cognitive model (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) suggests that through exposure the 
traumatic memory becomes elaborated and contextualised into previous and 
subsequent experience, which reduces intrusions. In addition, negative appraisals of 
the trauma and its sequelae need to be changed, in line with the theory of shattered 
assumptions (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Finally, behavioural and cognitive strategies to 
control both perceived threat and symptoms should be stopped. 
 
Clearly therefore, existing theories of PTSD largely suggest that an individual needs 
to be fully exposed to the traumatic memory, to enable emotional processing to occur, 
and the memory to be updated and contextualised, to prevent further intrusions.  
 
ImRs: Effectiveness Factors and Mechanisms of Action 
Considering the emphasis that existing theories place on exposure to the traumatic 
memory, the effectiveness of ImRs appears contradictory. In contrast to suggestions 
from these theories, ImRs involves changing the ending of the traumatic memory, no 
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matter how inconceivably, and does not require exposure to the whole memory (Arntz 
et al., 2013).  
 
Arntz (2012) suggested that future research should examine both the optimal 
therapeutic method and the underlying processes of ImRs, such as the “fundamental 
levels of memory representations that ImRs acts on” (p.199). Arntz (2012) 
highlighted that while emotion, cognition and meaning change are important, the 
question remains, “what happens to the original memory?” (p.201). There currently 
appear to be two prominent theories that could fundamentally underlie the technique. 
Firstly, ImRs might change the existing memory, likely through a process of 
reconsolidation and updating the meaning (Arntz, 2012). Secondly, ImRs might create 
a new, less negative, alternative memory, which is more accessible and therefore wins 
retrieval competition over the traumatic S-rep (Brewin, 2006; Brewin et al., 2010). It 
is foreseeable that ImRs could also work due to a combination of these theories. 
Furthermore, change in memory processing during ImRs from perceptual to 
conceptual could also act as a mechanism for change. It is clear that to explore the 
mechanisms of action, the factors that create a clinically effective rescript need to be 
examined also (Arntz, 2012). These factors are likely to be wide ranging, with 
possibilities including: accessing original emotions and cognitions, changing 
emotions or cognitions, meeting unmet needs, facilitating self-efficacy, and adapting 
factors related to the rescript itself. Thus far, there has been limited research into 
effectiveness factors and the mechanisms of action of ImRs, and no definitive theory 
proposed. 
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Memory change as a fundamental mechanism of action. 
Changing the original traumatic memory. One potential mechanism of action 
is that ImRs changes the original traumatic memory. Hackmann (1998) suggested that 
imagery techniques access and transform meanings of negative memories. It is 
possible that changing the meaning of one memory could change meanings across a 
memory network (Wheatley & Hackmann, 2011). It has been proposed that ImRs 
could work by ‘UCS-revaluation’, that is, a change in meaning of the US stimulus, the 
traumatic event (Arntz, 2011; Arntz, 2012; Arntz & Weertman, 1999). Arntz (2014) 
suggested that the aim of ImRs is to incorporate new information into the traumatic 
memory, to reduce dysfunctional meaning, so a reminder of the trauma will result in 
the new memory representation being accessed, along with decreased distress. This 
would suggest that memory reconsolidation is occurring. As previously mentioned, 
this is in contrast to a proposed mechanism of action of extinction, and dual 
representation theory (Brewin et al., 2010) and retrieval competition hypothesis 
(Brewin et al., 2006), which both suggest a new memory representation is created. If, 
conversely, ImRs changed the original memory this would be beneficial for treatment 
generalisation, and therefore possibly decrease the chance of relapse (Debiec et al., 
2011). 
 
Research exists to support this proposed mechanism of action. Dibbets et al. (2012) 
conducted an analogue study in which participants viewed a traumatic film to create a 
conditioned fear response, were subject to different extinction conditions, and were 
then presented with the original context to determine if fear returned. Including ImRs 
in the extinction procedure resulted in less return of fear following a context change, 
and the US was rated less negatively. The authors suggested that this demonstrates 
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that ImRs changes the US, thereby changing the meaning of the original memory. 
Furthermore, Hagenaars and Arntz (2012) conducted an analogue study in which 
participants viewed a traumatic film and then 30 minutes later used either ImRs, 
unrelated positive imagery or engaged in IE. The results showed that those in the 
ImRs condition experienced fewer intrusions in the following week and fewer 
negative cognitions. The authors suggested that ImRs changed the meaning of the 
traumatic event, rather than replacing or erasing the memory (Arntz, 2012). 
 
In line with this, Lane, Ryan, Nadel and, Greenberg (2015) recently proposed a theory 
suggesting that therapeutic changes stem from “updating of prior emotional memories 
through a process of reconsolidation that incorporates new emotional experiences” 
(p.1). This is in line with ideas from emotional processing theory, whereby the 
network is activated and new and corrective information is incorporated by modifying 
memory structures that underlie emotional responding (Foa & Kozack, 1986; Foa et 
al., 1989). Lane et al. (2015) proposed that it is possible that once a memory is 
changed, the original memory and associated emotions may no longer be retrievable. 
However, others disagree, in relation to ImRs at least, stating that factual memory of 
the event may be enhanced and it is the meaning that is changed (Arntz, 2012; 
Hagenaars & Arntz, 2012). Arntz (2012) also proposed that if facts of the traumatic 
memory remain this suggests that this original memory is not replaced by a new, more 
accessible memory. ImRs therefore may activate old emotional responses and 
incorporate new and corrective emotional elements to the original traumatic memory, 
through reconsolidation (Lane et al., 2015).  
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Creating a new, more accessible memory. In contrast, the dual representation 
theory (Brewin et al., 1996; Brewin et al., 2010) and the retrieval competition 
hypothesis (Brewin, 2006) propose that ImRs is effective due to the creation of a less 
negative and more accessible memory, which wins retrieval competition over the 
original traumatic memory. Brewin et al. (2010) suggested that ImRs works by 
retrieving the C-rep of the intrusive memory/image, projecting it onto the precencus, 
and then accessing the content of associated S-reps. The information in the S-reps is 
then contextualised by linking with a new C-rep. This new C-rep is a mixture of 
negative information, and positive novel information. Subsequently, when this new C-
rep is retrieved into the precencus, positive emotions and sensations will be retrieved 
from S-memory. Brewin et al. (2010) suggested that this new C-rep then wins 
retrieval competition over the old C-rep, whereas Dibbetts and Arntz (2015) 
suggested it is accessed rather than the old S-rep. Importantly, regardless of the 
accuracy of the rescripted image, if it is more accessible, the traumatic memory will 
be inhibited (Brewin, 2006; Brewin et al., 2009). Research supports this proposal, for 
example Stopa and Jenkins (2007) found that when participants with social phobia 
held a negative image in mind, this inhibited the retrieval of positive images. They 
suggested that ImRs might therefore inhibit the retrieval of negative information and 
promote the retrieval of positive information. 
 
Brewin (2015) suggested that the retrieval competition hypothesis (Brewin et al., 
2006) is better placed to explain therapeutic change, than Lane et al.’s (2015) model 
of reconsolidation. He proposed that evolutionarily it would be more effective for a 
memory system to retain information to aid future survival, there is evidence for the 
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stability of memory, and having two memory systems that are more or less accessible 
helps to explain relapse from conditions such as PTSD. 
 
Changing memory processing. It is possible that the nature of memory 
processing facilitated by ImRs could be linked to its effectiveness. It has long been 
suggested that traumatic memories are represented at a sensory, perceptual level, and 
lack conceptual representation, and that treatment needs to promote conceptual 
processing (Brewin et al., 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Studies have demonstrated 
that data-driven processing and resulting perceptual memory representations during 
and after trauma can predict PTSD symptoms (Halligan, Michael, Clark, & Ehlers, 
2003; Kindt, van den Hout, Arntz, & Drost, 2008; Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002). 
Kindt et al. (2007) conducted a study to examine the effects of IE and ImRs on 
perceptual and conceptual processing of a traumatic memory and PTSD symptom 
reduction. They found that when controlling for conceptual processing, an increase in 
perceptual processing was not directly linked to symptom reduction. However, initial 
increases in perceptual processing resulted in later increases in conceptual processing, 
which were linked to symptom reduction. The results highlight the importance of 
promoting conceptual processing, aided by increasing perceptual processing. 
Unfortunately, the stand-alone effects of ImRs were not determined. Arntz et al. 
(2007) suggested that that ImRs addresses a wider range of emotional and cognitive 
elements of the trauma than just exposure (Arntz & Weertman, 1999; Smucker & 
Niederee, 1995), which could facilitate conceptual processing. However Arntz (2012) 
proposed that a shift in processing alone could not explain changes in post-traumatic 
cognitions seen with ImRs. 
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Furthermore, Dibbetts and Arntz (2015) highlighted that ImRs elaborates and 
integrates the traumatic memory into a context in long-term autobiographical 
information, providing a time context, which decreases fear generalisation and the 
memory being triggered (Hackmann, 2011). This is in line with mechanisms of 
change suggested for PTSD treatment more generally (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
 
Factors that create an effective rescript. It is important to consider how to 
create a clinically effective rescript, that is, examining the optimal therapeutic method 
(Arntz, 2012). Factors that increase effectiveness are likely to link to mechanisms of 
action in some form, such as memory change. Arntz (2012) suggested that change to 
the original memory due to ImRs may depend on reactivating the emotional memory 
and the kind of rescripting used. It has been proposed that retrieving the new rescript 
is aided by practising retrieval, the memorability of the rescript and a positivity bias 
(Wheatley et al., 2007). A recent case series design developed a coding scheme, 
which captured important factors of an ImRs session and applied this to six cases to 
examine how these factors related to treatment outcome. Links were tentatively 
suggested, as they were not statistically examined (Salter, 2014). Multiple factors 
were found to be related to improved outcome, including: attitude towards ImRs 
(participants needed to be motivated and engaged), activation of the image, ability to 
follow ImRs, activation of original and new internal processes (emotions, cognitions 
and physical sensations), believability and a change in attitude towards the original 
traumatic event. Other recent research examined the effectiveness of ImRs in treating 
survivor guilt and suggested factors that could increase effectiveness, however these 
were also not statistically examined (Medin, 2015). These included: therapists guiding 
the imagery; modifications being made directly to the imagery sequence; the imagery 
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being active but not overly vivid or emotionally charged; and the re-scripted image 
compelling and evoking new thoughts, feelings and sensations. 
 
Addressing emotions and cognitions.  
Accessing original emotions and cognitions. As previously mentioned, Arntz 
(2012) suggested that reactivating the emotional memory could be important in 
memory change, in line with promoting elaboration and contextualisation in PTSD 
treatment (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Indeed, Salter (2014) suggested that the most 
symptom improvement after undergoing ImRs occurred when individuals experienced 
original internal processes not so intensely that they became highly distressed and not 
so minimally that processing was not facilitated. Other research has also demonstrated 
ImRs to facilitate access to original internal processes (Brewin et al., 2009), which is 
unsurprising considering research demonstrating a stronger link between images and 
emotions, than images and verbal material (Holmes et al., 2008; Holmes & Mathews, 
2010). This raises the question of how much exposure to the original traumatic 
memory is necessary before rescripting occurs, to enable activation of emotions and 
cognitions. Kindt et al. (2007) suggested that the original memory should be activated 
to some extent to provide corrective information. However, Arntz et al. (2013) 
demonstrated pre-emptive rescripting to be effective, in which arguably fewer original 
emotions and cognitions might be activated. Wheatley and Hackmann (2011) stated 
that it does not seem necessary to relive the intrusive event in its entirety before 
rescripting, just moments of high affect and distressing meaning. Overall, therefore, it 
is important to consider further the extent to which activating original emotions and 
cognitions contributes to rescripting effectiveness.  
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Changing emotions and cognitions. It is likely that the effectiveness of ImRs 
is not due solely to accessing original emotions and cognitions, but rather shifting 
away from these and/or adding new, more positive, emotions and cognitions. In 
contrast to exposure, the premise of ImRs is to alter the outcome of a memory/image, 
changing associated emotions and cognitions to alleviate distress (Dibbets & Arntz, 
2015). Smucker (1997) suggested that emotional and cognitive disturbances 
stemming from traumatic memories are strongly associated with intrusive images and 
therefore modifying these “becomes a powerful if not preferred means of processing 
the traumatic material” (Holmes et al., 2007, p.298). In line with this, Salter (2014) 
suggested that participants who could not create new internal processes or who only 
experienced a decrease in original internal processes during ImRs symptoms did not 
experience improvement. 
 
Regarding emotions, Holmes et al. (2007) stated that imagery techniques in CBT 
draw on the premise that imagery affects emotion (Holmes et al., 2008; Holmes & 
Mathews, 2010) and that this can therefore be a powerful tool in alleviating distress. 
Research has already demonstrated ImRs to be effective in changing an individual’s 
emotions. Arntz et al. (2007) found that when treating PTSD, IE and ImRs combined 
had better outcomes for emotions other than fear, than IE alone. Furthermore, Rusch 
et al. (2000) found that ImRs created a positive change in participants’ affect, perhaps 
due to many individuals choosing to create humorous or absurd rescripts. They 
suggested that these positive rescripts could promote inhibition of associated negative 
affect (Wolpe, 1958; 1995). If ImRs has a positive effect on emotions, it is clearly 
important to determine if certain emotions are particularly effective to include, to 
promote greater therapeutic gains. It has been suggested that obtaining a sense of 
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control or mastery in the rescript is important (Rusch et al., 2000; Wheatley et al., 
2007, Wheatley & Hackmann, 2011). For example, seeking revenge against 
perpetrators in imagery can increase feelings of control (Holmes et al., 2005), whilst 
not leading to increase in anger generally (Seebauer, Frob, Dubaschny, Schonberger, 
& Jacob, 2014), perhaps due to satisfying rather than suppressing this need (Arntz et 
al., 2007; Arntz, 2014). It has also been suggested that incorporating compassion can 
be therapeutically beneficial (Gilbert, 2005; Wheatley et al., 2007; Wheatley and 
Hackmann, 2011), perhaps particularly relevant for ImRs related to childhood trauma 
(Arntz & Weertman, 1999; Smucker et al., 1995). Importantly, generating 
compassion, even through imagery, has been found to activate neural pathways that 
will then be more readily activated in the future (Gilbert, 2005). 
 
Regarding cognitions, standard treatment according to a cognitive model (Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000) involves accessing the meaning of traumatic events and updating this 
with information that challenges the maladaptive meaning (Ehlers et al., 2005; 
Wheatley & Hackmann, 2011). Wheatley and Hackmann (2011) proposed that ImRs 
does this but allows for “artistic license” (p.445) in modifying the memory, but state 
that the rescript should be closely related to key cognitions for it to be meaningful 
(albeit for depression). Research has demonstrated ImRs to change maladaptive 
cognitions. Long and Quevellion (2009) suggested that ImRs activates the traumatic 
memory and then changes trauma-related cognitions, which has been demonstrated in 
a range of presenting issues from social anxiety (Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015) to the 
experience of abuse in childhood (Smucker et al., 1995). When treating trauma related 
nightmares, it was found that exposure, relaxation and rescripting therapy resulted in 
improvements in traumatic cognitions, still evident six months later. This was linked 
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to an improvement in PTSD symptoms, however causality and the stand-alone 
effectiveness of ImRs were not established (Long et al., 2011). In line with basic CBT 
concepts, it is likely that change in emotions is linked with a change in cognitions, 
and visa versa. For example, by introducing a felt sense of compassion into an image, 
individuals may indirectly challenge cognitions such as ‘I am worthless’ (Hackmann, 
Bennett-Levy, & Holmes, 2011). However, further research is required to determine if 
certain emotions and cognitions are most effective to address in ImRs, as this 
currently remains unclear (Wheatley & Hackmann, 2011). 
 
Increasing self-efficacy. Linked to cognition change, another important factor 
to consider when creating an effective rescript, or even as a mechanism of action 
itself, is self-efficacy. Self-efficacy is the belief that one has the means and abilities to 
produce desired effects through one’s actions (Bandura, 1977). As mentioned, Long 
et al. (2011) found that a treatment incorporating ImRs resulted in a decrease in 
traumatic cognitions, associated with a decrease in PTSD symptoms, which had the 
strongest relationship with a decrease in a perception of incompetence measure. They 
suggested therefore that a mechanism of action of ImRs could be change to 
cognitions, but particularly those relating to one’s own ability and/or judgement. It is 
possible, therefore, that a sense of self-efficacy gained through ImRs could contribute 
to therapeutic change. Firstly, this could be considered in relation to control over 
intrusive mental images. Long et al. (2011) highlighted that poor image control has 
been linked to anxiety disorders, such as PTSD, and therefore it is possible that low 
self-efficacy in controlling images could lead to continued distress. Rusch et al. 
(2000) noted that ImRs differs from other imagery techniques as individuals largely 
decide on their own changes to images and suggested that this control may then be 
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utilised more broadly, resulting in further positive emotions and outcomes. This is 
likely to be increased by developing a sense of mastery and self-efficacy in the 
images themselves, probably in stark contrast with experiences during the traumatic 
event (Smucker et al., 1995). Secondly, it is possible that increasing self-efficacy in 
using certain emotions within rescripts could translate to doing this more generally. 
For example, Smucker et al. (1995) found that utilising compassion in rescripts 
resulted in an increased ability to self-soothe, both during and outside of sessions. 
 
Meeting unmet needs. Arntz (2012) highlighted the importance of individuals 
being able to express needs, feelings and actions that were inhibited at the time of the 
trauma, often to ensure survival. Arntz (2011) suggested that this may promote 
emotional and cognitive processing and healing, a concept proposed by experiential 
therapies (Edwards, 2007). Indeed, early imagery work utilised this concept, for 
example, Perls (1973) encouraged individuals to express unmet needs through 
imagery to decrease cognitive and emotional avoidance. Meeting emotional needs 
through imagery is particularly discussed in the literature in relation to ‘type b’ 
techniques, through changing underlying schemas resulting from needs not being met 
in childhood (Arntz, 2011). However meeting these needs is also relevant for ‘type a’ 
techniques too (Hackmann, 2011). Arntz (2012) even suggested that this might act as 
a mechanism of action for ImRs. 
 
Considering the nature of the image. When creating an effective rescript it is 
likely to be important to consider factors related to the image itself, such as vividness 
and perspective. Vividness can be defined as the “luminosity and clarity of mental 
imagery, as well as the extent to which an individual's subjective experience of 
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imagery is similar to actual perceptual experience” (Pearson, Deeprose, Wallace-
Hadrill, Heyes, & Holmes, 2013, p.7). Research has suggested that the vividness of an 
image is linked to detailed sensory representations stored in memory (Baddeley & 
Andrade, 1998). A neuroimaging study found image vividness in different modalities 
was linked to higher activation in the same brain areas as perception in that modality 
(Belardinelli et al., 2009). Other therapeutic approaches also utilise the vividness of 
mental images, for example, EMDR harnesses visual working memory capacity to 
interrupt the vividness of the traumatic memory (Arntz, 2012), as does the 
aforementioned ‘cognitive vaccine’ (Holmes et al., 2009, p.1). It is possible, 
therefore, that the vivid nature of the image could be linked to ImRs effectiveness. It 
has also been suggested that the more vivid an image, the easier it is to recall 
(Cornoldi, de Beni, Cavedon, & Mazzoni, 1992) and that the more something is 
recalled, the easier it is to do so in the future (Tversky & Khaneman, 1973), which 
would clearly be beneficial for the effectiveness of ImRs long-term. In support of this, 
Salter (2014) tentatively suggested that participants who could not vividly imagine the 
rescript did not demonstrate symptom improvement. A further factor to consider 
could be the perspective from which the individual views the rescript (Salter, 2014). 
Viewing a traumatic memory from a ‘field perspective’, as if re-living it, rather than 
from an ‘observer perspective’ (Nigro & Neisser, 1983), has been found to result in 
emotional, physiological and psychological reactions more in line with those at the 
time of the trauma (McIsaac & Eich, 2004). It has been suggested that experiencing 
these could facilitate emotional processing of the memory (Rachman, 1980), whereas 
an observer perspective could be used to reduce emotion (Brewin et al., 2010; 
McIsaac & Eich, 2004). Therefore, the perspective adopted during the rescript could 
affect access to original emotions and cognitions, and perhaps then the ability to 
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change these. However, there is a lack of research into factors linked to the nature of 
the rescript during ImRs directly, so the proposed are possibilities only which should 
be examined further. 
 
Summary: Links to memory change. Multiple factors have been proposed 
that could potentially be linked to the effectiveness of ImRs such as accessing and 
changing emotions and cognitions, meeting unmet needs, increasing self-efficacy, and 
adapting the rescript itself. It is complex, however, to ascertain whether these factors 
are linked directly to memory change or are mechanisms of action in their own right, 
such as changing emotions and self-efficacy. Furthermore, it is unclear whether these 
factors support the idea that ImRs facilitates a change in the original memory (Arntz, 
2012) or the creation of a more accessible alternative memory (Brewin, 2006; Brewin 
et al., 2010). For example, in relation to emotional and cognitive change, emotional 
processing theory (Foa & Kozack, 1986; Foa et al., 1989) would propose that the 
original traumatic memory is activated and new, adaptive emotions and cognitions are 
incorporated into the fear network. Arntz (2012) would suggest a similar mechanism 
of action, with new information changing the meaning through ‘re-evaluating’ the US. 
In contrast, Brewin (2006) and Brewin et al. (2010) would propose that new, adaptive 
emotions and cognitions create a new memory representation, which inhibits the 
original traumatic memory and associated negative arousal. In relation to factors 
related to the rescript, such as vividness and perspective, it could be argued that these 
create a more emotional and memorable rescript, likely to promote reconsolidation of 
the traumatic memory (Arntz, 2012). Conversely, these could increase the 
accessibility of the alternative memory, resulting in it winning retrieval competition 
(Brewin, 2006; Brewin et al., 2010).  
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In fact, there currently appear to be few ways to empirically test which theory of 
memory underlies ImRs, and indeed it could be a combination of both. Arntz (2012) 
suggested that the classical conditioning return of fear paradigm could be utilised to 
examine this further, as it is predicted that there will be less return of fear with context 
change if ImRs changes the US-representation itself, instead of forming a competing 
memory trace. This is yet to be extensively examined however. 
 
Present Study 
It is clear that there is much still to learn about the optimal therapeutic method, the 
underlying processes, and the links between these in ImRs (Arntz, 2012). An 
increased understanding of this will improve future clinical effectiveness. Arntz 
(2012) even proposed “fundamental studies should be done to unravel what the 
underlying processes [of ImRs] are” (p.203). Research exploring this is in its infancy 
(Arntz, 2012) and there appear to be limited ways to clearly examine underlying 
mechanisms of ImRs and therefore this study aimed to address this gap in the 
literature. 
 
Qualitative approach. Qualitative methods are often adopted in areas where 
the literature is in its infancy, to gain a rich and detailed understanding of a 
phenomenon, through examining individual perspectives. To the author’s knowledge 
a qualitative study is yet to examine ImRs specifically, gaining a perspective from 
‘the inside out’, in a way that quantitative studies cannot. A ‘Psych Info’ and ‘Web of 
Science’ search using the terms ‘imagery rescripting’ and ‘qualitative’ returned four 
and three results respectively, only two of which were qualitative research studies 
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examining ImRs and PTSD. One examined the experience of imagery techniques of 
individuals with a PD diagnosis, in preparation for ImRs (ten Napel-Schutz, Abma, 
Bamelis, & Arntz, 2011). They found that whilst participants felt imagery was 
valuable, more attention should have been paid to the emotional impact, supplying 
sufficient information, and the unpredictable nature of the duration of imagery 
exercises. The other paper was a dissertation, which examined the relationship 
between imagery rescripting and emotional processing of traumatic incest, finding a 
positive relationship (Agbuis, 1996). Neither study examined effectiveness factors 
and mechanisms of action of ImRs and neither used a Grounded Theory (GT) 
approach. 
 
Examining the first hand, subjective experience of individuals who had undergone 
ImRs could suggest factors that contribute to an effective rescript. For example, did 
participants experience change in their emotions, thoughts, both or neither? Was this 
important to them for therapeutic change? Information could also be gained regarding 
individuals’ subjective experience of the more fundamental mechanisms of action, 
such as memory change, which could be hard to elucidate through quantitative 
research. For example, did they experience a traumatic memory that had changed, two 
competing alternative memories, both, or neither? Information on links between 
effectiveness factors and mechanisms of action could also be suggested. Importantly, 
the use of GT allowed this rich description to be summarised in a model. With this in 
mind, 10 participants who had completed ImRs as part of their treatment for PTSD 
were interviewed, to address the following research questions. 
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Research questions. The research questions were to explore individuals’ 
experience of ImRs in PTSD treatment, to consider factors that influenced its 
effectiveness and potential mechanisms of action, relative to what is proposed by 
existing theory. A model is proposed, aiming to increase theoretical understanding of 
ImRs, and so in turn, increase clinical effectiveness. 
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Chapter 2: Method 
 
Participants 
Sample. Ten participants were recruited by therapists at a London-based 
trauma service (n = 10, mean age = 47, males = four, females = six). Participants were 
either current clients or clients who had been discharged within the last 18 months. 
The criteria set for time since discharge was initially six months, to promote clarity of 
recall when answering the interview questions. However, the two initial pilot 
interviews were with participants who had been discharged over six months ago and 
therefore had completed the ImRs technique even longer ago. No deterioration in the 
detail recalled regarding the technique was evident and therefore they were included 
in the results and the time since discharge criteria was expanded to 18 months. Initial 
sampling was completed in line with the inclusion/exclusion criteria and clinical 
judgement, followed by theoretical sampling, in line with a GT methodology 
(Charmaz, 2014) (see design and analysis section). However, due to time constraints 
imposed on the study it was not possible to adequately adopt theoretical sampling and 
therefore obtain theoretical sufficiency (Dey, 1999). All potential participants 
contacted by therapists gave consent to be contacted by the researcher and all 
subsequently agreed to take part in the study. See Table 1 and 2 for demographic and 
clinical information, and questionnaire scores respectively. The questionnaires used to 
situate the sample were those used most regularly in the service at the time of the 
study, the Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa, 1995) and the Beck 
Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). 
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Inclusion and exclusion criteria. Inclusion criteria regarding PTSD diagnosis 
and treatment included: a) experience of one or more traumatic events in adulthood 
resulting in PTSD (defined by DSM-V; APA, 2013), b) a primary diagnosis of PTSD 
(all levels of psychopathology at the time of ImRs and currently were included), c) 
currently receiving or having received (no more than 18-months post discharge) 
treatment for PTSD at the trauma service, d) having undertaken a memory-reliving 
component of treatment, e) having undertaken an ImRs component of treatment to 
address a minimum of one ‘target memory’. Inclusion criteria regarding timing of the 
ImRs intervention included: f) a minimum of one-month delay following completing 
ImRs for the first ‘target memory’ before the interview was conducted, g) able to 
recall enough information about ImRs to answer interview questions. The last 
criterion was changed from an initial time frame of 12 months. This was due to it 
becoming clear in the two initial pilot interviews that no deterioration in the detail 
gained regarding the technique was evident when participants had been discharged 
within 18 months and therefore completed ImRs even longer ago.  
 
It was initially assumed that the interviews would focus largely on rescripting of  
‘type a’ images to adult trauma, due to the service criteria (see inclusion criterion a). 
However, throughout the study it became clear that two participants at least had also 
rescripted childhood traumas and discussed these in the interviews. The data from 
these interviews was still included as these interviews yielded rich and detailed 
information about the ImRs technique. 
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Exclusion criteria included: a) being currently suicidal, b) being currently psychotic, 
c) being currently dependent on illicit drugs or alcohol, d) not speaking sufficient 
English to understand the interview questions. 
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Table 1.  
Sample demographics and clinical information. 
Participant Gender Age at 
interview 
(years) 
Ethnicity Single, 
multiple, 
sustained 
trauma 
Number of 
traumas 
resulting in 
PTSD 
symptoms 
Time since 
index trauma 
at interview 
(years) 
Clinician Previous 
psychological 
input for 
PTSD 
Total 
number of 
sessions at 
interview 
Total 
number of 
ImRs 
sessions at 
interview 
Time since last 
ImRs session at 
interview 
P1 
 
 
F 
 
45-54 White 
British  
Multiple 
Sustained 
20 11  Core Yes 134 10 18 months 
P2 
 
 
M 
 
45-54 White 
British 
Multiple 2 34 Core No 22-core 
20-core 
4 known  Approximately 
27 months 
P3 
 
 
M 
 
25-34 Asian 
Indian 
Multiple 
Sustained 
20 7.5  Trainee 
Core 
No 12-trainee 
20-core 
6 2 weeks 
P4 
 
 
F 
 
35-44 Black 
African 
Sustained 3 episodes 10 Core No 42 15 4 months 
P5 
 
 
F 
 
45-54 White 
Other 
Multiple 2 18  Core No 196 40 1 month 
P6 
 
 
M 
 
45-54 White 
British 
Single 1 3 years  
9 months 
Core Yes 24 6 9 months 
P7 
 
 
M 
 
45-54 Black 
African 
Multiple 
Sustained 
30 33  Core No 70 10 12 months 
P8 F 
 
55-64 Any other 
group 
Sustained Unknown 14 Core Yes 12 3 1 month 
P9 F 
 
45-54 White 
Other 
Sustained >13 Approximately 
16  
 
Core Yes 194 Unknown 10 days 
P10 F 35-44 White 
British 
Multiple 
 
2 33 Core No 33 13 Approximately  
2 weeks 
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Table 2.  
Questionnaire scores: Pre and post treatment. 
Participant The Post-traumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS) The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) 
 
 Pre 
 
Post Change Pre Post Change 
P1 
 
 
36 24 -12 
(severe to moderate-severe) 
44 23 -21 (severe to moderate) 
P2 
 
 
42 41 -1 
(remained severe) 
50 43 -7 
(remained severe) 
P3 
 
 
44 
 
Still in treatment - 55 Still in treatment - 
P4 
 
 
50 
 
Still in treatment - 55 Still in treatment - 
P5 
 
 
Not completed Still in treatment - Not completed Still in treatment 
 
- 
P6 
 
 
48 
 
Not completed - 37 6 -31 (severe to minimal) 
P7 
 
 
39 21 -18 
(severe to moderate-severe) 
36 10 -26 (severe to minimal) 
P8 
 
 
45 
 
Still in treatment - 41 Still in treatment - 
P9 
 
 
47 
 
Still in treatment - 41 Still in treatment - 
P10 
 
37 Still in treatment - 29 Still in treatment - 
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 Ethical considerations. The study was considered appropriate for 
proportionate review and the National Research Ethics Service North West Preston 
Research Ethics Committee granted approval on the 5th of October 2015. The local 
Research and Development department granted approval on the 18th of November 
2015 and subsequently the Royal Holloway University of London Departmental 
Ethics Committee granted approval on the 4th of December 2015 (Appendices 1-4).  
 
Potential participants were provided with sufficient information to make an informed 
decision about participating and were made aware of their right to withdraw at any 
time, without giving a reason, and without it affecting their current or future care in 
any way. Participants’ information remained confidential throughout the study, with 
therapists identifying potential participants, who were only contacted by the 
researcher if consent was provided. Participants’ data was stored separately to their 
names, using participant numbers. Participants were informed prior to the interview 
that if risk issues arose the researcher would break confidentiality and discuss this 
with a therapist and/or inform relevant services. This occurred in one interview and 
the risk management protocol was followed appropriately. Managing participants’ 
distress was carefully considered and participants were repeatedly reminded that they 
did not need to discuss the traumatic event(s) if they did not wish to. If participants 
became distressed they were reminded that they did not have to answer every question 
and could withdraw at any time. A debrief occurred and if they remained distressed 
therapists were available to discuss this. Likelihood of distress was given close 
consideration, with research suggesting participation is generally well tolerated in 
those who have experienced trauma (Griffin, Resick, Waldrop, & Mechanic, 2003). 
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The information sheet provided to participants detailed these ethical considerations 
(Appendix 5). 
 
Design and Analysis 
The study adopted a cross-sectional, qualitative, semi-structured interview design. 
GT, specifically Charmaz’s (2000) constructivist approach, was chosen as the 
methodology.  
 
Choice of methodology. A qualitative analysis approach was adopted to 
enable an exploratory, in depth, rich analysis of participants’ experiences of the ImRs 
technique. Considering the lack of research into the mechanisms of action underlying 
the technique and factors that moderate its effectiveness, a qualitative approach was 
chosen for its ability to “uncover and understand what lies behind any phenomenon 
about which little is yet known” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.19). 
 
GT. GT originates from sociology and social interactionism and begins by 
examining individuals’ experiences and moves towards conceptual categories as 
explanations of the data (Charmaz, 2003). The aim of GT is to produce a framework 
to aid understanding of a phenomenon (Willig, 2001). GT was first introduced by 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) and promoted “the discovery of theory from data” (p.1), 
rather than the testing of existing theories. They proposed that theories exist to be 
discovered, rather than created, in line with a positivist approach. Charmaz (2014) 
describes this as objectivist GT, which assumes an external reality and discovery of 
data. Following the original publication, Glaser (1992) continued to describe a non-
prescriptive and flexible version of GT. In contrast, Strauss and Corbin (1990; 1998) 
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proposed a more prescriptive version of GT (utilising coding paradigms) and 
importantly acknowledged that researchers could be influenced by existing theories 
(Charmaz, 2014). Subsequently, Charmaz (1990; 2000) proposed a constructivist 
version of GT, in contrast to Glaser’s (1992) and differing from Strauss and Corbin’s 
(1990; 1998) approaches. Constructivist GT acknowledges the researcher’s subjective 
involvement in constructing and interpreting the emerging data and resulting theory 
(Charmaz, 2014). The theory created therefore is one possible view of the data, not 
the only truth, more in line with an interpretive approach and subjective GT, which 
assumes multiple realities and construction of data through interaction (Charmaz, 
2014). Charmaz (1990) stated that the researcher brings to the study “the general 
perspective of their disciplines, their own philosophical, theoretical, substantive, and 
methodological proclivities, their particular research interests, and their biographies” 
(p.1170). 
 
Rationale for using GT. The aims of the study were to gain an understanding 
of the experience of the ImRs technique as part of treatment for PTSD from those 
who have gone through it, including what made it more or less effective, relative to 
what is proposed by existing theory. GT enables researchers to “examine what is 
happening, or has happened in studied phenomena” (Morse et al., 2009, p.13), and is 
therefore an appropriate method to examine the processes underlying a technique. 
Importantly, GT generates theories with explanatory power to examine an inherent 
process, rather than just identifying themes of unstructured subjective experience 
(Birks & Mills, 2011).  
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Although GT initially appeared to address the research questions, other qualitative 
methods, such as Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) were considered. 
IPA stems from a philosophical position and examines the meanings that different 
experiences, events and states have for individuals and how they make sense of their 
personal and social worlds (Smith, Flowers, & Osborn, 1997). The researcher 
attempts to gain an insider perspective (Conrad, 1987), whilst acknowledging a 
‘double heuristic’, that is, participants are trying to make sense of their world, while 
the researcher is trying to make sense of the participants’ attempts to make sense of 
their world (Smith, et al., 1997). IPA focuses on the experiences and changes in 
experiences for an individual, as interpreted by the researcher, however does not 
provide an explanation for this, which could curtail understanding of a phenomena 
(Willig, 2001). Furthermore, it is not used to construct theory, as Larkin and 
Thompson (2012) stated, “the purpose is exploratory rather than explanatory” (p.103). 
It was felt therefore that GT was best suited to address the research questions. 
 
Rationale for using constructivist GT. Charmaz’s (2000) constructivist GT 
was adopted for multiple reasons. Firstly, the researcher felt that it was important to 
account for their prior knowledge of the area and resulting assumptions. To be able to 
be transparent about the potential influence of these upon the data and resulting 
theoretical model was felt to be essential. Secondly, Charmaz (2006) highlighted the 
importance of using GT flexibly, unlike previous versions. A constructivist approach 
allows making use of existing theory to partially inform interview questions and also 
takes into consideration certain confines of the study, such as time limitations.  
 
	 59	
Position of the researcher and reflexivity. In line with a constructivist 
approach, the researcher reflected on how their background, knowledge, assumptions 
and perspectives may have affected the data and resulting theoretical model. The 
researcher was a female trainee Clinical Psychologist, who had not carried out 
qualitative research prior to this study. Unlike participants, the researcher had not 
experienced a severe traumatic event and therefore had not undergone treatment for 
PTSD. Whilst conducting the study the researcher was working in a trauma service, 
had received training and supervision on ImRs and had used the ImRs technique in 
clinical sessions. The researcher therefore had a clinical interest in the area and 
knowledge of the literature before entering the field, including having completed a 
literature review. As a result of this the researcher had ideas about the potential 
mechanisms of action of ImRs, such as changes in memory (e.g., dual representation 
theory [Brewin et al., 2010] and re-evaluation of an unconditioned stimulus [Arntz, 
2012]), changes in cognitions and/or emotions, and this was used as a basis for the 
interview questions. 
 
While early GT largely suggested the researcher should be separate from the data, 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) did acknowledge, “the researcher does not approach reality 
as a tabula rasa” (p.3). Harper (2013) suggested that the process of trainee researchers 
reading literature can stimulate curiosity, support appropriate questioning and avoid 
narrow analysis. He proposed that what was essential was for researchers to be 
transparent about their assumptions, with awareness of these assumptions in fact 
aided by knowing the literature. Corbin and Strauss (2008) stated that experience and 
understanding could result in researchers being more in tune with participants, 
allowing a greater insight. Bulmer (1979) suggested that a resolution is to view a 
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theory as a constant ‘flip-flop’ between ideas and research experience and that 
‘sensitising concepts’ provide initial ideas to pursue in research. The researcher 
however ensured that these sensitising concepts were “a place to start inquiry, not to 
end it” (Charmaz, 2014, p.31) and that existing ideas did not prevent them from 
seeing things that did not fit with these (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
 
To minimise the impact of this prior knowledge the researcher kept a reflective 
research diary throughout the study and consistently reflected on their position in 
relation to and influence on the data (Appendix 6). This was discussed in both 
individual and peer research supervision.  
 
Theoretical sensitivity. Linked to reflexivity is the concept of theoretical 
sensitivity (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Strauss and Corbin (1990) suggested that 
theoretical sensitivity is an awareness of the subtleties and meaning of the data. This 
comes from an understanding of the literature, professional and personal experience 
and from the research process itself. Theoretical sensitivity involves the ability to 
recognise that the data has relevance for the emerging theory, which should increase 
as the research progresses (Birks & Mills, 2011). 
 
Theoretical sampling and theoretical saturation. GT suggests a theoretical 
sampling approach, whereby sampling and data analysis occur concurrently, with 
sampling decisions based on the ability of the data to add to the developing theory, by 
elaborating and refining categories (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
Theoretical saturation is the point at which it is felt that gathering more data about a 
theoretical category would reveal no new properties or theoretical insights (Charmaz, 
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2014). The meaning of saturation has long been discussed (Morse, 2011) and has been 
suggested to be a judgement that takes into account the research situation, including 
time constraints (Wiener, 2007). Dey (1999) suggested ‘theoretical sufficiency’ 
(p.257) as a more appropriate term, as while it also suggests thorough analysis, it does 
not claim exhaustive completion of category generation. This concept was therefore 
adopted in this study. 
 
Following therapists initially sampling in line with inclusion/exclusion criteria, 
theoretical sampling was then considered. The researcher met with the research 
supervisor regularly during the research process to discuss the on-going analysis and 
implications for theoretical sampling, which was adopted where possible. For 
example, participants were recruited with varied experiences of the effectiveness of 
ImRs to generally explore effectiveness factors. Furthermore, participants were 
recruited with a range of time having elapsed since completing ImRs, to explore any 
changes in effectiveness over time. However, due to time constraints it was not 
possible to adequately adopt theoretical sampling to explore and saturate emerging 
categories, and therefore claims of theoretical sufficiency cannot be made.  
 
Data collection. GT allows for multiple approaches to data collection, such as 
interviews, ethnography and documents (Charmaz, 2014). Interviews were felt to be 
most appropriate to gain a rich and detailed understanding of participants’ experience 
and allow the researcher to enquire further as information relevant to the research 
questions arose.  
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Interview schedule. The initial interview schedule was extensively developed 
with the research supervisors, aiming to explore participants’ experience of ImRs with 
a particular focus on the potential underlying mechanisms of action of the technique 
(Appendix 7). As previously mentioned, prior knowledge guided the interview 
questions, with areas including: participants’ experience of ImRs, the potential 
mechanisms of action of ImRs, the process of ImRs, the effectiveness of ImRs, and an 
enquiry if anything had not been covered. Charmaz (2014) suggested that novice 
researchers should develop a detailed interview guide, in line with Karp’s (2009), 
suggestion that this sets out ‘domains of inquiry’ (p.40) and fundamental issues to 
cover.  
 
Service user consultation. Three of the early interviews were conducted with 
members of the trauma service’s service user action group. Two of these interviewees 
provided feedback regarding: whether the questions were understandable or 
confusing, if there was anything they would add given the aims of the study, if they 
felt the questions were distressing and any suggested changes to alleviate this. 
Feedback suggested that the questions were understandable and not unnecessarily 
distressing. One participant suggested it would be helpful to have a clearer definition 
of ImRs before beginning the interviews, which was adopted for future interviews. 
The two initial interviews conducted with members of the service action group were 
considered as ‘pilot interviews’ to check the suitability of the interview questions. 
However these were subsequently included in the analysis as it was felt that the initial 
interview schedule questions were appropriately addressing the research questions, 
despite smaller changes being made following feedback. 
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Adapting the interview schedule. The interview schedule was considered after 
each interview and adapted if necessary, in line with the GT approach (Charmaz, 
2014). For example, following five interviews it became clear that participants often 
discussed the original traumatic memory and the rescripted memory as separate 
entities and so questions were added to explore the nature of this delineation further 
(Appendix 8). 
 
Interviews. Interviews consisted of an approximately five-minute introduction 
to answer any remaining questions and obtain written informed consent (Appendix 9), 
the interview with an average length of 90 minutes, and an approximately five-minute 
debrief. All interviews were conducted at the trauma service in a private room and 
were audio-recorded with written consent. The interview schedule was used as a 
guide only and the researcher was flexible in questioning to create a sensitive 
interaction considering individuals’ experiences and preferences (Hugh-Jones & 
Gibson, 2012). ‘Out of pocket’ travel expenses were to be paid for participants, if they 
were not travelling to the service that day anyway, however no participants requested 
this. 
 
Post interviews. Participants were also asked prior to the interview for consent 
to allow the researcher to obtain demographic and clinical information from their 
therapist (Tables 1 and 2 and Appendix 10), which was collected following the 
interview. Participants were also asked prior to the interview if they would like to be 
contacted at a later date to provide feedback on an initial model and all 10 participants 
agreed to this. A brief summary of the results and an initial model were sent to all 
participants (Appendix 11). However, no participants responded with feedback in the 
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time available and so this could not be incorporated. Participants were also sent a 
summary of the results post completion of the study if they requested this at the 
interview. If participants consented, a letter informing their General Practitioner of 
their participation in the study was sent (Appendix 12). 
 
Data analysis. 
Transcribing. All interviews were transcribed verbatim by the researcher, to 
become immersed in the data, to provide ideas and understanding, and to give an 
opportunity to look again at the interview in detail (Charmaz, 2014). Transcription 
was completed as soon as possible following each interview to allow theoretical 
sampling to be considered. Once transcribed, the audio recording was securely 
deleted. Guidelines for transcribing were followed (McLellan, MacQueen, & Neidig, 
2003). 
 
Coding. Following transcription, the interview was coded, that is, “to stop and 
ask analytic questions of the data we have gathered” (Charmaz, 2014, p.109). Coding 
involves naming/labelling segments of data that categorises, summarises and accounts 
for it (Charmaz, 2014). This process links collecting data and generating theory. 
Charmaz (2014) suggests that GT coding consists at a minimum of 1) initial coding, 
2) focused coding and that 3) theoretical coding can be utilised if the data indicates. 
The coding procedure adopted in this study is outlined below. 
 
Stage one: Initial coding. Initial coding includes naming each word, line or 
segment of data simply and precisely. Charmaz (2014) recommends line-by-line 
coding and this approach was therefore adopted in this study. Four questions were 
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asked during initial coding: 1) what is this data a study of, 2) what does the data 
suggest, pronounce or leave unsaid, 3) from whose point of view, and 4) what 
theoretical category does this data indicate (Charmaz, 2014). Gerunds (verbs) were 
used when coding to promote staying grounded in the data, therefore remaining open 
to all theoretical directions, rather than imposing existing assumptions and ideas. In-
vivo codes were also used, by paying close attention to participants’ language, and 
coding special terms used, to retain their meaning (Charmaz, 2014). During initial 
coding any gaps in the data were observed, to suggest later directions for theoretical 
sampling. 
 
Stage two: Focused coding. Focused coding involves ascertaining the most 
frequent or significant initial codes and testing these with larger amounts of data. To 
do this, decisions were made regarding which initial codes should be used to 
categorise the data (Charmaz, 2014). Birks and Mills (2011) suggested that the 
researcher should identify explanatory and conceptual patterns in the data at this 
stage. These codes should be those with more theoretical power, direction and 
centrality (Charmaz, 2014). Glaser (1978) suggested that focused codes are more 
conceptual than initial codes. It was important to take a critical but unbiased view of 
initial codes and their development into focused codes, to prevent forcing the data, in 
line with preconceived ideas (Charmaz, 2014). 
 
Stage three: Theoretical coding and diagramming. Theoretical codes were 
utilised in this study as the next step in the GT analysis. Theoretical codes organised 
focused codes into categories to enable a theoretical model to be developed. Charmaz 
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(2014) described this as telling “an analytic story that has coherence” (p.150). A 
model that represents the emergent findings was generated (Figure 2). 
 
Memos and constant comparative analysis. Memos are analytic notes about 
the data, that is, written records of a researcher’s thinking throughout a GT study 
(Birks & Mills, 2011). Memos were written throughout the study to capture the 
researcher’s thoughts and reflections and aid in developing a model (Appendix 6). 
Memos were used as the tool for constant comparative analysis at every coding phase, 
the process of constantly comparing the emergent analysis for similarities and 
differences – “incident to incident, incident to codes, codes to codes, codes to 
categories and categories to categories” (Birks & Mills, 2011, p.11). This also later 
enabled theoretical saturation, or sufficiency (Dey, 1999), to be considered. 
 
Research quality. Guidelines for quality in qualitative research were followed 
throughout the study as a quality control measure (Elliot, Fischer, & Rennie, 1999). 
The researcher carefully considered their theoretical and personal perspective on the 
research before commencing the study. Through writing a reflective research diary 
and discussing this in supervision, the researcher remained mindful of how these 
perspectives could construct and contribute to the data and emerging model (‘owning 
your own perspective’) (Appendix 6). To provide a context and enable the reader to 
judge the relevance of the findings, detailed demographic and clinical information 
was collected to situate the sample (Tables 1 and 2) (‘situating the sample’). To make 
transparent the fit between the data and subsequent understanding and also enable 
readers to consider alternative understandings, extracts are provided of the research 
diary, memos, transcribed interviews and coding (Appendices 6 and 13) (‘grounding 
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in examples’). Multiple approaches were used to provide credibility checks. Firstly, 
the research supervisors, who had extensive knowledge of the area, read the first three 
transcribed interviews. It was decided that the interview schedule was appropriately 
addressing the research questions. Secondly, triangulation methods were used to 
check the codes, with the research supervisors looking over the initial codes for two 
interviews to check the codes were grounded in the data. A trainee working in a 
similar area also coded a section of the first interview and this was cross-checked with 
the researcher’s codes. These codes were sufficiently similar, which suggested the 
researcher was not missing important information and the codes were a good fit with 
the data. Thirdly, the researcher also met with a peer supervision group, which 
included practicing and comparing codes to determine an appropriate understanding 
of the coding procedure. Fourthly, following the development of a model, 10 
participants were contacted to provide feedback, however feedback was not provided 
in time to be incorporated in the findings (‘providing credibility checks’). To ensure a 
coherent understanding of the data that resonated with the reader, quotes were 
provided for codes, research supervisors and a trainee checked the emerging codes, 
and participants were asked to provide feedback (‘coherence’ and ‘resonating with the 
reader’). Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggested that theoretical concepts should be 
applicable and recognised by participants, even if the final model does not fit all 
aspects of their experience.  
 
Procedure 
Pre-recruitment stage. Typical treatment for PTSD at the trauma service 
involves assessment, formulation, goal setting, IE, and then ImRs if clinically 
indicated. ImRs can last from one session to multiple sessions over months, with 
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rescripting one image taking approximately two to five sessions. ImRs involves 
individuals giving an oral narrative of their intrusive memory/image and their 
therapist asking them what they would like to change and/or what they need. 
Following this, an alternative image is created to incorporate this. This image is 
modified as necessary in future sessions and individuals practice bringing this image 
to mind between sessions. 
 
Recruitment stage.	
Recruitment setting. Participants were recruited from a London-based trauma 
service between December 2015 and April 2016. Individuals accepted into the service 
are over 18 years old, have experienced one or more traumatic events in adulthood 
and have been diagnosed with PTSD (as defined by DSM-V, APA, 2013). The 
service offers specialist outpatient assessment, psychological treatment (TF-CBT and 
EMDR) and consultation. 
 
Recruitment process. Therapists at the trauma service conducted initial 
screening of potential participants based on inclusion/exclusion criteria and clinical 
judgement. Clinical judgement largely refers to clinicians’ knowledge of potential 
participants who met the inclusion/exclusion criteria. For example, clinical judgement 
was necessary when determining potential participants who it was felt would recall 
enough information about ImRs to answer interview questions. Furthermore, clinical 
judgement was also used to exclude clients who it was felt would find the interview 
process detrimentally distressing. While this may have resulted in a different sample 
than if all those who had completed ImRs were invited to interview it was felt 
necessary both due to time restraints and ethically. Therapists either discussed the 
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study with potential participants or contacted those who had been discharged within 
the last 18 months. If the potential participant gave verbal consent, the therapist 
securely provided their name and contact details to the researcher. The researcher then 
contacted the potential participant to discuss the study and sent them an information 
sheet (Appendix 5). The potential participant was then given time to consider whether 
they would like to participate, a minimum of 24 hours following receiving the 
information sheet. The researcher then contacted them again to answer any questions 
and gain verbal consent to meet for an interview, if the potential participant chose to 
take part. Written informed consent was gained at the beginning of the interview by 
the researcher (Appendix 9). The interview was then conducted, followed by time to 
debrief. If participants consented, an initial theoretical model was also sent to them to 
provide feedback at a later date. See Figure 1 for a diagrammatic representation of the 
study. 
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Figure 1.   
A Diagrammatic Representation of the Study. 
 
 
 
 
If consent given participants contacted to give feedback on a theoretical model  
Therapists make a decision regarding who is suitable for the study based on inclusion/exclusion 
criteria and clinical judgement 	
Option One: Potential participants who 
have been discharged  
- Participants must have completed the 
memory-reliving component of treatment 
- Participants must have completed treatment 
using the ImRs technique to address a 
minimum of one ‘target memory’ (one ImRs 
intervention) 
- There must be a minimum of a month delay 
following this intervention before the 
interview is conducted 
- If discharged, participants must have been 
discharged within the last 18 months 
- Participants must be able to recall the 
technique sufficiently to answer questions 
 
Option Two: Potential participants who 
are currently being seen for treatment  
- Participants must have completed the 
memory-reliving component of treatment 
- Participants must have completed treatment 
using the ImRs technique to address a 
minimum of one ‘target memory’ (one ImRs 
intervention) 
- There must be a minimum of a month delay 
following this intervention before the 
interview is conducted 
 
In person or telephone: Therapist describes 
the study and answers any initial questions. 
Potential participant gives verbal consent to 
be contacted by the researcher 
 
In person: Therapist describes the study and 
answers any initial questions. Potential 
participant gives verbal consent to be 
contacted by the researcher	
Therapist securely provides the potential participant’s name and contact details to the researcher 
Researcher contacts potential participant to discuss the study and answer questions. If verbal 
consent is given the researcher sends them an information sheet 
 
 
Interview stage: 1) Questions and written informed consent (5 minutes), 2) interview 
(approximately 90 minutes), 3) debrief (5 minutes). Risk protocols followed if necessary 	
Researcher contacts potential participant again (minimum 24 hours after receiving information 
sheet). If potential participant consents to participate an interview is arranged 
Participants sent a summary of the findings following study completion 
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Chapter 3: Results 
 
Overview 
Nine theoretical codes emerged from the data during the final coding stage, consisting 
of 34 focused codes generated in an intermediate coding stage, consisting of initial 
codes generated at the first coding stage (Table 3). These codes related to either 
potential fundamental mechanisms of action or factors that moderated the 
effectiveness of ImRs. The effectiveness factors are presented in an approximate 
temporal order, including pre, during and post ImRs session stages, although 
inevitably there will be overlap between these stages. For example, it is 
acknowledged that ‘importance of general imagery ability’ (focused code 2.1) could 
be considered a pre-ImRs factor also. Therefore, it is helpful to consider ‘during 
ImRs’ effectiveness factors as factors present at the point of rescripting. Quotes are 
presented to illustrate each focused code and demonstrate how the codes are grounded 
in the data1. A model has been developed to summarise the potential fundamental 
mechanisms and factors that moderated the effectiveness of ImRs (Figure 2).  
 
Confidentiality 
All identifying information has been removed from the quotes to preserve 
participants’ anonymity. Two participants requested to see a list of potential quotes 
following transcription to further consider whether to provide consent for these to be 
included. Quotes were then included, or not, in line with this. Participants are also 
referred to with a participant number throughout. 																																																								
1 Words in an arrow bracket (e.g., <name>) are used for anonymity. Words in square brackets (e.g., 
[imagery]) have been added so that the quote can be easily understood. A string of dots (...) shows that 
a section of the quote has been removed to promote clarity. 
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Table 3.  
Theoretical codes, focused codes and initial codes. 
 
Theoretical Codes Focused Codes Initial Codes 
Pre ImRs Session 
1. Factors preceding ImRs 
 
1.1. Nature of the trauma memory Linking increased time living with trauma 
memories with decreased ImRs success 
Perceiving more distressing memories as 
harder to change 
Identifying not having a complete memory as 
a barrier to ImRs 
1.2. Attitude towards treatment and 
change pre ImRs 
Needing to want a solution to a problem 
Needing to accept the need for treatment 
Identifying commitment to the treatment 
process as important 
1.3. Attitude towards the ImRs 
technique pre ImRs 
Needing to be open to the idea of ImRs for it 
to be effective 
Suggesting ImRs effectiveness depends on 
desire for it to work 
Needing to want to change the ending 
During ImRs Session 
2. Individual differences 2.1. Importance of general imagery 
ability 
Being aware of own visualisation abilities  
Identifying visualisation ability as a barrier to 
ImRs 
2.2. Ability to believe in the rescript  
 
Struggling that the rescript is imagination not 
reality 
Struggling to believe the rescript is true 
Attempting to believe in the memory 
constantly 
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2.3. Effect of mood Noticing stress levels impact on ability to 
change ending 
Struggling to access rescript when low 
Disbelieving the rescript more when low 
Feeling low increasing the need to choose the 
happier ending 
2.4. Level of dissociation  Finding dissociation interferes with ImRs 
Identifying dissociation as main obstacle to 
ImRs 
2.5. Level of motivation  Highlighting perseverance as important 
Feeling motivated to practise at home to 
achieve positive outcomes 
Suggesting effectiveness depends on how 
much you want to believe in the rescript  
2.6. Metacognitive insight 
(mechanism of action) 
Discovering the possibility of using 
imagination to change a memory 
Using the ability to tune in and out of 
memories/rescripts long-term to alleviate 
distress  
Choosing to take a new perspective rather 
than think of the past  
Linking change to memories to change in life 
more generally  
2.7. Level of self-efficacy 
(mechanism of action)  
Feeling able to use the technique effectively 
Knowing when to and being able to change 
ending when feel in danger in memory 
Growing the confidence to change things 
autonomously in the rescript 
Having control over thought processes 
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3. The importance of the therapeutic structure 3.1. Timing of ImRs in the 
treatment process 
 
Feeling ready to use rescripting after other 
therapeutic work  
Having a sense of right order of therapeutic 
techniques 
Feeling natural to move from reliving to 
rescripting 
Feeling it was necessary to complete reliving 
first  
3.2. Timing of the rescript in the 
memory 
Wanting the rescript to have occurred earlier 
to have the support  
Needing rescript just before the worst 
moment to feel relevant  
Finding rescripting after the worst moment 
helpful 
Needing the contrast between threat and 
rescript for maximum effectiveness 
3.3. Viewing ImRs as part of a 
treatment package 
Deciding that improvements are due to two 
types of rescripting, imagery and knowledge 
Using imagery rescript to reiterate cognitive 
updates  
Seeing imagery rescripting as part of a larger 
treatment process 
4. The importance of the therapist 
 
4.1. Trust in the therapist Needing to trust the therapist for ImRs to be 
effective 
Identifying the therapeutic relationship as 
important for ImRs effectiveness 
4.2. Level of support and guidance 
with rescripting  
Experiencing the rescript as joint endeavour 
with therapist  
Finding it easier and safer to rescript with 
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therapist than alone 
Using therapist guidance to make decisions 
such as what and when to rescript 
4.3. Using the therapist’s presence 
in the rescript 
Wanting to not be alone in the rescript 
Finding it helpful for therapist to meet needs 
in the rescript 
Utilising therapist modelling in the rescript 
initially until confidence grows  
Experiencing the therapist changing the 
ending as helpful in childhood memories 
5. Creating an effective rescript 
 
5.1. Level of agency in choosing the 
rescript 
Advising giving people agency to decide on 
the ending themselves 
Experiencing a personally generated idea 
creating the most powerful rescript  
Creating a rescript true to inner soul was 
important 
5.2. Optimal vividness Needing vividness in the rescript 
Experiencing the sensory nature of the image 
as helpful 
Finding the rescript not clear but still 
experiencing effectiveness 
5.3. Optimal perspective Experiencing field perspective as more 
helpful  
Attempting to achieve field perspective and 
failing  
Finding it helpful to observe the bad 
moments and progress to field perspective 
Feeling more in control in field perspective 
Needing to use field perspective to be the 
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agent of change 
6. Felt sense change mechanism 
 
6.1. Changing emotions 
 
Feeling less petrified in rescripted memory 
Needing something to balance the feeling of 
guilt 
Finding the rescript allows anger to be 
released 
6.2. Changing feeling states 
 
Feeling safe, protected and less vulnerable in 
the rescript  
Feeling comfort and compassion in the 
rescript 
Gaining power and control in the rescript 
6.3. Completing behavioural urges  Being enabled to do things not possible at the 
time of the traumas 
Finding it helpful to complete actions not 
possible at the time of the trauma 
6.4. Generalising feeling and 
behaviour change to general life 
Feeling less anger generally due to the 
rescript 
Viewing rescripting as a reminder of not 
being guilty 
Feeling able to deal with being alone more 
easily post rescripting 
7. Memory change mechanism 
 
7.1. Changing the original traumatic 
memory 
Experiencing the trauma memory and the 
rescript as one 
Rewriting the trauma memory 
Viewing rescripting as permanently changing 
the trauma memory 
7.2. Creating an alternative better 
memory 
Experiencing two separate memories, 
original and rescripted  
Feeling there are two memories 
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Experiencing trauma memory remaining but 
having an alternative to focus on 
7.3. A change point in the memory  
 
Experiencing a break in the memory 
Experiencing a cut-off between the trauma 
memory and the rescript 
Post ImRs Session 
8. Long-term accessibility of the rescript  8.1. Automatically accessing the 
rescript 
Experiencing rescript popping into mind 
automatically at difficult moments 
Consistently experiencing the trauma 
memory and rescript as combined 
8.2. Intentionally accessing the 
rescript 
Effortfully trying to replace the trauma 
memory with the rescripted memory 
Attempting to access the rescript to prevent 
access of trauma memory 
Needing to decide to retrieve rescripted 
ending 
Finding the rescript cannot be grabbed if it is 
not already in mind 
8.3. Change in accessibility and 
strength of the rescript over time 
 
Finding rescript is increasingly available over 
time  
Suggesting the power of the rescript will 
increase over time 
9. Enhancing on-going use of ImRs 9.1. Rehearsing the rescript 
 
Finding regular rescripting increases 
effectiveness 
Finding rehearsal increases accessibility  
Using the rescript regularly until it becomes 
second nature 
Needing a mind-set that practice is essential 
9.2. Developing rescripting skills Achieving autonomy in rescripting 
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 Modifying rescript created in session to 
strengthen memory 
Utilising rescripting often after learning the 
skill 
9.3. Using rescripting aids 
 
Finding it powerful to use objects/images to 
aid visualising 
Utilising drawings as cues increases 
effectiveness 
9.4. Using the rescripted image 
more broadly 
Using the rescripted image more generally in 
life in addition to in the memory 
Sending the rescript ‘mentally’ to 
help/support others 
9.5. Attitude towards the ImRs 
technique post ImRs 
 
Viewing the rescript as a lifeline 
Treasuring the rescripts 
Being encouraged by early rescripting 
successes linking to future rescripts 
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Pre ImRs Session 
1. Factors preceding ImRs. 
 1.1. Nature of the trauma memory. Three participants felt that factors related 
to the traumatic memory itself moderated the effectiveness of ImRs. For example, 
participants suggested that the more temporally distant the traumatic event, the more 
familiar the memory was, and therefore the more difficult to imagine an alternative 
ending. Furthermore, it was suggested that the more distressing the traumatic 
memory, the harder it was to change. 
 
“I’ve had this thirty odd years (…) it’s not a new thing for me, erm, because I have 
them so often, flashbacks and memories and things (…) it’s like driving down the 
same roads all the same time and going home you see, and suddenly you go a 
different way, it’s kind of err err…it feels slightly alien, you know, it feels strange” 
(P2) 
 
“particularly with childhood trauma that’s been with people for a really long time um 
you know you need something of equal weight to balance that” (P10). 
 
“it just seems that things are so, sort of, seared on my soul that it’s very difficult to 
imagine some other way” (P2) 
 
One participant felt that if the traumatic memory had gaps in it, and therefore felt 
incomplete, it was difficult to make changes during ImRs. 
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“if there are parts of the memory that you can’t remember, where you don’t have, so 
there are gaps in the story [it is a challenge for ImRs]” (P5) 
 
1.2. Attitude towards treatment and change pre ImRs. Participants’ attitudes 
prior to beginning ImRs were another factor linked to effectiveness in the pre ImRs 
stage. Participants suggested that to enable ImRs to be effective they needed to have a 
positive attitude to treatment and change generally. They felt an individual needed to 
feel able to accept the need for treatment, want a solution to a problem and be 
committed to the treatment process. 
 
“an individual has first to accept that he she needs treatment so if you have, if you 
have a condition and you are given the tablets to take and you don’t take the tablets, 
you won’t, you won’t get the benefit of the tablets” (P7) 
 
“it all depends on an individual and how much (…) she or he wants to get a kind of a 
solution to that problem” (P7) 
 
“your commitment to wanting to do it [makes it successful] because it’s not easy and 
it probably makes it worse before it gets better” (P5) 
 
1.3. Attitude towards the ImRs technique pre ImRs. Participants’ attitudes 
regarding ImRs specifically also moderated its effectiveness. Participants shared that 
before beginning the technique they felt concerned regarding the prospect that ImRs 
was changing their memories, however later discovered that this was not their actual 
experience of the process. One participant in particular discussed the importance of 
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maintaining the accuracy of the memory in light of justice for the traumatic incident 
not being attained.  
 
“I don’t want to do that because that’s just lying and that’s not true” (P10) 
 
“I found it a strange idea, I imagined it like you’re altering your memory of the 
incident but that’s not really what it’s like” (P9) 
 
“I felt that for a long time the only thing I had to hold on to was the accuracy of my 
memory in the face of people um not sort of not, never being able to get justice (…) I 
felt that I couldn’t be dishonest, I felt that I couldn’t go back and change something 
(… ) it was almost like I had given myself a job to remember it accurately, the bits I 
could remember and I had to hold on to that” (P5) 
 
Participants highlighted the importance of being open to the idea of ImRs and having 
a positive attitude towards changing the ending for ImRs to be effective. 
 
“I think you do need to…open your mind and basically, you have to believe in what 
you’re doing because it’s not going to work otherwise” (P6) 
 
“To accept first that they have this thing on their mind and they want to find another 
way of looking at things” (P7) 
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During ImRs Session 
2. Individual differences. Within this theoretical code there are focused codes 
that can be conceptualised as moderators of effectiveness, such as imagery ability, 
ability to suspend disbelief, levels of dissociation and levels of motivation. There are 
also focused codes that could be conceptualised as mechanisms of action, for example 
metacognition and self-efficacy. 
 
2.1. Importance of general imagery ability. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was 
clear that individuals’ general ability to use imagery moderated the effectiveness of 
ImRs. Participants generally had a clear sense of their own visualisation ability. One 
participant suggested that a poor visualisation ability was one of the main barriers to 
ImRs and had to utilise physical objects in therapy to alleviate this (focused code 9.3). 
 
“I think mmm some people, and nothing to do with PTSD, some people say they can’t 
imagine things very easily but … I think I can do that relatively well” (P9) 
 
“I really struggled with doing the visualisation um and … to a point where we 
couldn’t really progress at all” (P5) 
 
2.2. Ability to believe in the rescript. Participants discussed the importance of 
believing in the rescript for it to be effective, that is, the need to suspend their 
disbelief. This focused code was adopted rather than ‘believability of the rescript’ as 
it was felt it better captured the varying personal ability to invest in and believe the 
rescripts, regardless of whether the scenario was possible in the constraints of time 
and space. Individual differences were found regarding whether participants wanted 
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the rescript to be realistic, “I couldn’t quite project err completely surreal image onto 
that” (P2), or whether a surreal rescript was effective, “none of my stuff is in any way 
realistic (laughs) all of it is completely fairyland, but I don’t know…to me that’s quite 
good” (P9). Therefore, participants’ ability to suspend their disbelief was relevant 
whether the rescript was logically believable, or not. Multiple participants 
experienced difficulty in believing, struggling with the rescript being imagination not 
reality. One participant summarised the technique by stating “you are going to tell me 
that this is a table when it is a chair” (P7). However, it was clear that having high 
motivation and a desire to believe contributed to effectiveness of ImRs (focused code 
2.5). 
 
“the whole kind of rescripting thing did feel slightly false” (P2) 
 
“I struggle with this is, ok this is happening now in my imagination but this is not the 
truth” (P4)  
 
A sense of coherence and the rescript feeling right was important to be able to believe 
in the rescript. One participant emphasised the importance of “emotional logic” 
(P10). 
 
“I think whether or not it happens real in time and place or is fantasy based, for me 
it’s not so much either of those options, it’s more you know that it’s got that, in terms 
of my own narrative, that kind of emotional consistency and that emotional logic, 
that’s what’s felt important” (P10). 
	 84	
2.3. Effect of mood. The effect of mood at multiple stages in the ImRs process 
was relevant. It was suggested that higher stress levels resulted in increased difficulty 
in changing the ending initially. Furthermore, low mood resulted in difficulties in 
accessing the rescript (theoretical code 8) and a cycle was experienced whereby not 
being able to access the rescript then further increased low mood. Being low in mood 
also decreased the ability to believe in the rescript, which was detrimental to its 
effectiveness (focused code 2.2). 
 
“I think when I’m particularly low sometimes I can’t bring him in even if I look at a 
picture of him (…) he just sort of not there, which as I say makes me feel more 
anxious because I’ve erm, where’s he gone or you know” (P1) 
 
“I struggle sometimes I said that devil the stress comes and telling me this is not true, 
this is not fact, this is lie” (P4)  
 
Conversely, one participant suggested that the lower they felt the more important it 
was to choose to think of the rescript and therefore they were more likely to do so. 
Another participant found that when they were feeling low the rescript was able to lift 
their mood. 
 
“When I think you’re at your lowest I think you know to be given an option, you’re 
always going to choose the happy ending” (P6) 
 
“I am stressed and like when I get stuck, if I, if I take this just for like a few minutes, 
to believe in a few minutes, it might just lift me or release me” (P4)  
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2.4. Level of dissociation. Only two participants discussed dissociation 
detrimentally affecting ImRs, however, it appeared significant to them. One 
participant identified this as the most prominent barrier to the technique, affecting 
their ability to visualise and resulting in a less well associated traumatic memory and 
rescript. 
 
“I think the main obstacle was the dissociation and just having no real control over 
that” (P5) 
 
“I was going through and I was changing it, still I know what happened to me, and so 
I just think about that and my mind goes back even though I’m changing it to 
something which is good erm for a good ending, but still my mind, still there” (P3) 
 
Conversely, another participant experienced the ImRs process as holding both the 
original memory and the rescript in mind alongside each other and “trying to feed in 
the new one” (P7), which prevented dissociation for them as they were engaged in the 
process. 
 
2.5. Level of motivation. Participants identified their level of motivation as an 
important factor in the effectiveness of ImRs to initially change the ending. 
 
“try to sort of throw yourself right into it an and go from there, you know, really if 
you’re going to do it try and do, try and open your mind, an try an force yourself to 
think of so of err the different ending” (P2) 
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Additionally, motivation to believe in the rescript (focused code 2.2) was important 
for participants and moderated the effectiveness of ImRs. Participants discussed 
making a choice to believe in the rescript, despite knowing it was not reality, to 
alleviate distress.  
 
“I want to believe it’s, it’s true, I want to convince myself like … yea, I’m I’m, I’m 
trying” (P4) 
 
“you want to believe it so much, because you don’t want to, I mean for me personally 
I don’t want to live, to live in that, in that room, in that past tense and you come out 
into the light, that’s where I want to be, you know so, so I think if if you want to 
believe it, you will believe it (P6) 
 
Motivation to practise the rescript outside of sessions (focused code 9.1) was also 
seen as an important factor in increasing the effectiveness of the technique. 
 
“Yea err, bit hard [practising at home], but when you think you’ve got to do it then, I 
found I have to do this you got through, because I want to get better, to see myself as 
a different person” (P3) 
 
2.6. Metacognitive insight (mechanism of action). Some participants 
discussed metacognition, “knowledge and cognition about cognitive phenomena” 
(Flavell, 1979, p.906). That is, a higher order cognitive process that monitors and 
makes adjustments to lower order cognitive processes. Participants discovered their 
ability to change a specific traumatic memory through rescripting, a capability they 
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had previously been unaware of. It is possible that a sense of being able to control 
memories to alleviate distress is powerful and could contribute to why ImRs produces 
change. 
 
“I didn’t even know that there was a system like this to change things and to change 
memory” (P3) 
 
Experiencing control over specific memories then extended to other traumatic 
memories. In addition, participants discovered the ability to control their thought 
processes more generally and not tune in to distressing memories. One participant 
discussed developing the ability to take a new perspective of traumatic memories, and 
by doing so freed themselves from distressing thought processes by choosing to 
engage with more positive ones. 
 
“If it comes [traumatic memories], I let, I let the train go and just stay on the 
platform because I know which train I want to jump on” (P7) 
 
“I know there is another way of looking at things, it feels easier for me to connect 
quickly when this old thing that tends to bring me down” (P7) 
 
One participant even suggested that being able to change memories increased a sense 
that change was possible in general life. 
 
“before that [ImRs] I thought I was helpless and no one is helping me, I’m just a 
failure as a person, whatever I do, it would just all be negative, so after doing this I 
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thought ok there is life after that as well you can still change things, so that has 
changed” (P3) 
 
2.7. Level of self-efficacy (mechanism of action). Closely linked to 
metacognitive insight, was self-efficacy. Participants needed to gain a metacognitive 
understanding that changing a memory and developing a new way of thinking was 
possible. Subsequently, if they achieved this, their levels of self-efficacy needed to be 
high, to increase ImRs effectiveness. Certain factors were linked to decreased self-
efficacy in rescripting, such as needing the therapist’s support (focused code 4.2) and 
so not developing rescripting skills (focused code 9.2).  
 
“if I were to ever to have a situation again this is what I would do [rescript] so I 
started to understand it was more about ok that happened then but now this is what I 
could do (…) and I have the ability to do that (…) and right now I’m learning how to, 
to do that” (P5) 
 
“when I remember something then as soon as I think I’m in danger then after that I 
just change it, change it to I’m free now, I had the power, I did this to them” (P3) 
 
“It’s my mind … so if I allow my mind to go back to the original part of it, I mess 
things up, I wouldn’t be able to know what I’m talking to you now, I go back to the 
old me and I start depressing myself with things that don’t make sense, I close myself 
in that small building in the flat, I don’t, I don’t bathe, I don’t like that … so I’ve been 
given an opportunity to look at something different, to look at things differently from a 
different angle and it’s working for me” (P7) 
	 89	
3. The importance of the therapeutic structure.  
3.1. Timing of ImRs in the treatment process. Generally participants felt that 
it was effective to utilise ImRs in the latter stages of treatment, in line with their 
treatment experience. They discussed a feeling of readiness for ImRs following the 
use of other techniques and a sense of a natural progression moving through the 
treatment process. 
 
“it was the right time that we started to do that [use ImRs], because there were the 
other techniques before, coping and what have you” (P1) 
 
“we had done the reliving bits and all that then it just seemed like a natural 
progression to go into, you know, rescripting the image, to try and change the way my 
mind was thinking” (P2) 
 
In line with this, most participants felt that, although distressing, it was important to 
complete reliving before rescripting. Different reasons were given for the importance 
of this, such as, wanting to remember the event before changing it, feeling the need to 
have a complete memory to create a different ending and using the traumatic memory 
as a guide for rescripting. 
 
“I think for me having it at the the latter end of it was better (…) I couldn’t of just 
gone in and gone oh yep that’s the memory, let’s change it” (P2) 
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“the relivings has just sort of opened out [the compacted trauma memory] and 
actually that’s allowed you know me to retrieve a lot more useful information that’s 
then fed in to the rescript” (P10) 
 
One participant described attempting rescripting and subsequently not feeling as if it 
was the right time and needing more reliving sessions first, resulting in a sense of 
failure (linked to focused codes 2.7 and 9.5), emphasising the importance of 
undergoing ImRs at the right time in treatment. They also highlighted the importance 
of giving enough time to the technique itself, “pacing” (P10) it correctly.  
 
“I think you can do it quickly but I don’t necessarily think it would be as effective or 
have that kind of deep sort of resonance (…) it does feel important to allow the time 
for the emotional connection to happen with the rescripts actually rather than just 
sort of, a sort of a sticking plaster of a new narrative” (P10) 
 
3.2. Timing of the rescript in the memory. Some participants would have 
liked the rescript to occur earlier in the memory, to experience support from the 
rescript throughout. Some participants felt the rescript occurring just before the worst 
moment was beneficial, so that it felt relevant. Some participants wanted the rescript 
to begin after the traumatic event. Two participants highlighted the need for contrast 
between experiencing the negative trauma and then later the positive rescript, to 
enhance the effects of the rescript. 
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“I probably would have liked him [the rescript] to come in a little bit earlier, before it 
all it did go wrong, you know if he was there just to walk me along, you know, walk in 
the room, or just being there” (P1) 
 
“just before the worst bit really [rescripting occurred], yea, I think it was [helpful to 
rescript at that point], because if I had rescripted any earlier it wouldn’t have felt as 
though it was relevant” (P2) 
 
“when you have danger and then you come onto the completely opposite side to, it’s 
better to have different thing, to do it first [reliving the traumatic memory] and then 
[rescripting]” (P3) 
 
3.3. Viewing ImRs as part of a treatment package. Four participants 
discussed how they viewed ImRs as one facet in part of a larger treatment package, 
“it’s a good one to have in your bag of tricks to try” (P2). It was felt that other 
therapeutic techniques were also necessary, rather than ImRs as a stand-alone 
technique, as different techniques enhanced the effectiveness of each other.  
 
“I think that there has to be a point of talking it through in a logical way, cognitive 
kind of way, but I don’t think you would ever really resolve anything with just that, 
you’d then need that other [ImRs]” (P5) 
 
One participant viewed the concept of ‘rescripting’ as more than just ImRs, but 
rescripting with information also, referring to cognitive restructuring, “the rescripting 
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is other things that we’ve worked on as well” (P1). They felt that the imagery 
rescripting could then incorporate cognitive work to strengthen both techniques. 
 
“by bringing <name of rescript> in and talking through <cognitive updates about the 
traumatic event> it is rewriting it and you know he isn’t that beast of a man or what 
have you (P1) 
 
One participant discussed the importance of looking beyond the traumatic memory in 
treatment, to the individual as a whole. 
 
“It’s not just oh let’s fix that memory, it’s like let’s deal with that memory but let’s 
also deal with the person, so that that person then feels confident to go out into the 
world and do things maybe a little bit differently and I wonder if that’s really 
important because even when you deal with that memory, I don’t believe that it’s all 
oh fixed now, I think there has to still be in the future trigger points that could re-
trigger symptoms even if they’re less so, so if you deal with the person they’re then 
able to deal with those trigger points” (P5) 
 
“there’s all sorts of things that you as a person bring to that and take away from it 
and so you can’t just be about rescripting” (P5) 
 
4. The importance of the therapist. 
 
4.1. Trust in the therapist. As with other therapeutic techniques, the 
therapeutic relationship, establishing trust and creating a safe environment were 
discussed as important for the effectiveness of ImRs. It was suggested that 
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establishing trust is especially important before working with traumatic memories, 
“you need to build up trust with the therapist before you jump straight in to kind of 
the more memory focused things” (P10). Particularly, with a technique such as ImRs, 
which may initially make less ‘sense’. 
 
“I also really trusted <therapist> so I think that’s a huge part of the whole process to 
work with someone that you really feel you can trust (…) I don’t think you could do it 
with just anybody, you’d have to build up that trust with somebody” (P5) 
 
“I had to trust her and accept and appreciate what she is doing but if someone is, 
doesn’t want to open up and say “ok I’m getting treatment, this is part of the 
treatment”, it might not make sense” (P7) 
 
4.2. Level of support and guidance with rescripting. Participants varied in the 
amount of support and guidance they required with the ImRs technique. Generally 
participants saw ImRs as a joint endeavour with the therapist, with one participant 
describing the process largely with the “we” (P4) pronoun. Participants relied on the 
therapist’s support to decide when in the treatment process to complete ImRs and on 
which moments to rescript. The feeling of safety created by the therapist and the 
formality of the therapeutic environment facilitated ImRs. One participant suggested 
that increased support with deciding on the rescript is particularly important for 
childhood memories.  
 
“I suppose where the traumas are more early trauma, and the sort of meanings are 
going to and the sort of sense when you’re going through the reliving is quite a young 
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sense because of course you’re doing it from that young point of view, I think in those 
cases it may need more sort of guidance and support” (P10). 
 
However, some participants needed the therapist’s support to such an extent they did 
not feel confident to rehearse the rescript or consider further rescripts outside of 
therapeutic sessions (linked to focused code 2.7 and theoretical code 9). 
 
“It felt errm positive after I had finished it but I I felt very, I felt very difficult, very 
difficult to keep going back to it on my own” (P2) 
 
“I couldn’t use the <rescript> or think about myself alone to do something like that 
at home” (P4) 
 
4.3. Using the therapist’s presence in the rescript. Two participants explicitly 
mentioned having the therapist present in the rescript and found this to be beneficial, 
describing feeling less alone and more supported. One participant found it helpful for 
the therapist to model behaviour in the rescript, such as being assertive and standing 
up for them, which enabled them to begin to do this for themselves. Also linked with 
this was finding it helpful for the therapist to lead the rescript and make decisions 
regarding what to change, for example, speaking to the perpetrators and taking the 
individual away from the traumatic scene. One of these participants specifically 
discussed that they were rescripting a childhood memory, for which the literature 
suggests the benefits of utilising the therapist as a supportive presence in the rescript 
(Arntz, 2011), “as a kid you can’t stand up to adults but if there is an adult there 
helping you [you can]” (P6) 
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 “I never had anyone there, and to have someone stand up for you sort of and say 
what he said um and address things that needed addressing you know and to take me 
away from the situation (…) to have someone that thinks that much of you to take you 
out of that situation straight off is er, is er, is, is quite you know something special I 
suppose” (P6) 
 
“I couldn’t say the things that he could say so he very much modelled and then kind 
of scaffolded me so you know through practice to be able to do that myself” (P5) 
 
5. Creating an effective rescript. 
5.1. Level of agency in choosing the rescript. Generally, most participants 
wanted to choose the change occurring in the rescript, contrasting to the therapist 
being in the rescript and making changes (focused code 4.3), perhaps influenced by 
whether the trauma occurred in childhood or adulthood. One participant advised that 
individuals should be given the chance to choose, “do the ending however they want, 
(…) let them decide how they want to” (P3). 
 
Interestingly, the same participant who had utilised the therapist in the rescript 
initially also said that the rescript that was the most powerful and strongly associated 
with the traumatic memory was the one they had autonomously decided upon; it felt 
like it fitted and solved a problem. 
 
“you know you get that sort of, that moment of when you get an idea that comes, not 
just to do with this, just in life, the way the brain works, that if you have that kind of 
eureka moment or you have an idea to solve a problem and that and you get that 
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sense of ahh! I think if, if the rescripting is associated with that kind of, where it’s 
really come from you and your own creativity or something that really matters to you 
then I think that somehow that then gets really strongly associated with that memory” 
(P5). 
 
Another participant suggested that it was important to have agency in choosing the 
rescript as the therapist was not there at the time of the traumatic event, so only they 
could choose exactly how they would have liked the event to have been. In line with 
this, multiple participants discussed the importance of choosing rescripts with 
personal meaning to them. One participant discussed the rescript needing “emotional 
logic” (P10), something it is likely only they could understand. 
 
“she wasn’t there when it happened so she wouldn’t understand … the smell … the 
flies (long pause) so it was, I went in a certain kind of … different world and brought 
what I thought … was cleansing and and (long pause) and true to my inner soul how I 
would have liked it to be” (P7) 
 
5.2. Optimal vividness. Participants generally experienced the rescript as 
vivid, which was helpful, “the more vivid the better I would say” (P9). Participants 
described using multiple senses to create a vivid rescript, such as: touch, “I could 
almost feel his fur” (P1); sight, “you know what colour the sky is” (P6); smell; and 
taste, “try to also imagine the smell of the food and texture of it and the different 
tastes” (P9). It was suggested that a vivid rescript aided effectiveness through 
creating new and vivid emotions and feelings, such as safety. One participant 
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suggested that over time the rescript became more vivid than the original traumatic 
memory. 
 
“that made it much more helpful I suppose, to use more than one sense” (P9) 
 
“at some point the rescript becomes more vivid than the, I mean the sensations of the 
rescript become more um vivid than the one of the original, of course I can remember 
it but it doesn’t actually cause the same sensations anymore” (P9) 
 
One participant suggested that the more vivid the rescript, the more cognitive 
resources it utilised, reducing the impact of the traumatic memory. 
 
“I think if you use more that one sense, it takes up more of (…) your brain power or 
something (laughs) you know what I mean and you get more and more into it and it 
takes you furth, more away from this original … um what you want to get away from” 
(P9) 
 
However one participant did not find the rescript to be particularly vivid, but still 
found it to be effective. 
 
5.3. Optimal perspective. Generally participants used both field and observer 
perspectives in the rescript, but found field perspective to be more beneficial, “it was 
both … but the one I like most, the one when I am participating myself” (P7). It was 
suggested that it was more difficult to create a rescript from field perspective, and 
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perhaps a progression was needed from observer to field. One participant wanted to 
observe traumatic events before progressing and making changes. 
 
“I think I tried to put myself in the sort of first person part of it but I couldn’t really, I 
had to be looking down” (P2) 
 
“it was good to see what was going on and observe the bad stuff and then realise the 
mistakes and progress from there so (…) I think they overlap but they overlap very 
well so first of all you’re observing what’s going on and then obviously you become 
part of the setting” (P6) 
 
Participants had different reasons for preferring to view the rescript in field 
perspective. One participant found it more intense. Two participants suggested it 
resulted in a feeling of increased control in the rescript and one also described 
needing to be the one to make the changes in field perspective to alleviate guilt they 
felt from actions taken at the time of the traumatic event. Another participant felt field 
perspective enabled them to utilise all their senses in the rescript. 
 
“ to do the change, so that I change whatever that is happening with being me and the 
action that is taking place (…) because I am the one suffering (long pause) and I am 
the one who did what happened” (P7) 
 
“I think the field perspective is really helpful (…) it ties into the physiological, the 
sensory, and to the emotional in a way that that sort of observer perspective doesn’t 
really” (P10) 
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6. Felt sense change mechanism. All participants, except for one for whom 
ImRs had been less successful, experienced a change in felt sense, which often 
addressed emotional needs that were not met at the time of the traumatic event. One 
participant summarised this in suggesting ImRs worked by “bringing about that kind 
of emotional shift within the memories” (P10). 
 
6.1. Changing emotions. Participants found key emotional states changed due 
to the rescript, including decreasing fear, releasing anger and alleviating guilt. One 
participant also experienced an increase in sadness that the rescript and what it 
represented had not been available at the time of the trauma. Another participant 
accessed emotions such as grief and forgiveness through rescripting. 
 
“if you can find a way of repressing that heavy yoke on your shoulder [guilt]…I think 
it would the best thing that could happen to an individual” (P7) 
 
“I mean it’s a bit like, you know when you’re very very angry and you punch a 
punching bag or something yea, I mean it’s not physical but it’s a, you know, mental 
way, it’s a sort of an equivalent, it helps you get rid of that aggression (laughs) and 
even though you don’t do anything but the sensation is … very similar” (P9) 
 
“it was emotional, I, just er, cried but it was a mixture of relief that it is…ended and 
sadness that she [the rescript] was not there before” (P8) 
 
One participant suggested that if their focus was on the new images, they would 
replace the negative emotions of the original memory, “for example this anger or for 
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example this void where you feel dead and it [the rescript] sort of fills that space 
because you can’t have both at the same time” (P9). 
 
6.2. Changing feeling states. Participants also described widely varied 
experiences of feeling states changing. For example, participants felt more protected, 
safer, less vulnerable and less alone in the rescript. Participants also described an 
increase in comfort, compassion and sympathy. A sense of being liberated, free and 
lifted was discussed. Participants also felt an increase in power, control and strength. 
One participant found it important to incorporate humour into the rescripts. One 
participant also described a decreasing in feeling “dead” (P9), with this being one of 
the most difficult felt senses to change. 
 
“I almost feel that it wasn’t you know, they weren’t going to do anything because he 
was there and he would step in if what have you, so that’s a complete going from 
completely vulnerable to I’ve got you know him there” (P1) 
 
“I was desperate for compassion and I couldn’t see it in anyone, (…) there was no 
sympathy from anybody even though I was in that state, I couldn’t walk, I couldn’t 
talk, I felt like oh everyone hate me and um but … now, so that was very important to 
find someone in those situations, even though I rescripted it, find someone who is with 
me, I am not alone” (P8) 
 
“getting the power to our side, like err getting the benefits onto our side like erm the 
strength you have after, how they had and how I have now” (P3) 
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However, one participant suggested that it was difficult to imagine a compassionate 
image with no personal experiences of compassion to draw upon. 
 
“maybe it was reason why I couldn’t find that image um … because er I couldn’t 
remember when um, being cared and (she starts to cry) and er … I just couldn’t 
remember any people or toys I have got, comfort me or make me happy” (P8) 
 
Interestingly, a change in cognitions was only occasionally mentioned and was 
usually linked to a change in felt sense. For example, two participants discussed a 
slight decrease in blaming themselves and then linked this to felt sense change, such 
as not feeling at fault and not feeling so pathetic. 
 
“I think that was one of the things that was holding me, sort of imprisoning me to the 
past is that I kind of blamed myself (…) so I think, I feel a lot, I sort of … more … I’ve 
resolved a lot of that and don’t feel that um … everything’s my fault” (P5) 
 
6.3. Completing behavioural urges. Participants also discussed completing 
behavioural action urges that were not possible at the time of the traumatic event. For 
example, gaining revenge and punishing the perpetrators, destroying items that had 
caused the most distress, completing appropriate cultural practices after someone had 
died and escaping the traumatic scene. Meeting these needs appeared to also change 
emotions and contribute to alleviating distress. 
 
“it makes sense, because in my culture, when someone dies, he should be buried” 
(P7) 
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“I freed myself, put them into a corner, showed them the gun and I was freeing 
everyone who was facing the same thing as me and I was running to save my life” 
(P3) 
 
6.4. Generalising feeling and behaviour change to general life. Five 
participants discussed that the feeling change experienced in the rescript generalised 
to life more broadly, for example, a decrease in anger, fear and guilt and an increase 
in compassion towards themselves. 
 
“connected to that memory or to things related somehow to it [anger has decreased], 
maybe not just to this particular memory because often there are lots of other things 
that are somehow related to it” (P9) 
 
“I needed something to help me understand…how I would live the rest of my life, the 
little time that I’m left with, I can’t carry on living with that heavy burden [of guilt] 
when there is another way of looking at things” (P9) 
 
“I think it has beyond that just more into my life really, I mean I’m feeling much more 
generally compassionate towards myself than I was when I first started” (P10) 
 
Furthermore, participants found the rescript changed their behaviour more generally, 
such as, being able to be alone more and asking family for help and support. When 
asked about the feeling of being alone now occurring in life one participant said “I 
can deal with it a lot easier, um quite a few times now I’ve found myself er well I walk 
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me dog and that, you know I choose to be on me own because I choose to think, 
whereas before I’d, I’d have to have a distraction” (P6). 
 
“it’s changed me outlook, I know, I know what I’m capable of, I know, you know, how 
strong a person I am or can be (…) I know what I’ve done in the past and (…) it just 
seems to be I can realise when I’m making them mistakes so you can move forward” 
(P6) 
 
7. Memory change mechanism. Participants experienced change to memory 
representations during an ImRs session in different ways. Firstly, feeling as if the 
original memory was permanently changed, and secondly, experiencing a new 
memory being created. Change to the original memory could be conceptualised as the 
trauma memory feeling as if it had been rewritten during an ImRs session. Inevitably, 
memory change during an ImRs session was closely linked to the accessibility of the 
memory following a session (theoretical code 8). 
 
7.1. Changing the original traumatic memory. Two participants described an 
experience of the original traumatic memory feeling as if it was “rewritten” (P5) or 
permanently changed, “it complete changed the ending of that memory” (P5). These 
participants found that the rescript was automatically accessed following a rescripting 
session (focused code 8.1). 
 
“it almost did feel like I had rewritten that bit like I had actually changed it (…) I’ve 
carried that around with me for so long and it just felt like it just, that part of it, just 
left” (P5) 
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“you could probably say it’s replaced it but not in a deluded kind of way” (P5) 
 
“rewriting, that’s what I think she will be there even though it didn’t happen but in 
my memory she will exist in that moment” (P8) 
 
7.2. Creating an alternative better memory. Alternatively, the majority of 
participants discussed their sense of a new memory being created during ImRs, with 
two memories then existing: the original traumatic memory (although this often felt 
less distressing) and the new more positive rescript. The effectiveness of ImRs then 
depended on the accessibility of the rescript, which if accessed would alleviate 
distress (theoretical code 8). 
 
“Two memories [exist now], one with the original ending and one with the imagined” 
(P3) 
 
“he [therapist] could give me a new memory, which appealed, to the old one so I’d 
rather have a new one or try and think of a new one” (P6) 
 
“I was stepping on the old one, I was stepping on it creating a new one” (P7) 
 
7.3. A change point in the memory. Two participants described an experience 
of a change in the memory between the original traumatic memory and the rescript. 
One participant described this as a “break” and a “cut off” (P9) and suggested this 
sensation was similar to the “higgledy-piggledy” (P9) nature of flashbacks where at 
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the most distressing and emotional moments breaks in the memory occur. Another 
participant experienced the rescript like “flicking through channels” (P10). 
 
“all of a sudden like a cut-off and then I can sort of choose to do it and sometimes it 
comes out automatically more, but sometimes it’s like, it feels like there’s a little 
break but it might just go on” (P9) 
 
“something in your brain notices there is a break somewhere, there’s something that 
doesn’t flow from, yea flow on” (P9) 
 
“there was a really interesting almost like a kind of flicking through channels or 
something, you know there was kind of a momentary thing of the original memory 
there and then very quickly it kind of came in with the rescript” (P10) 
 
Post ImRs Session 
8. Long-term accessibility of the rescript. As previously mentioned, the 
accessibility of the rescript was closely linked to the memory change that had 
occurred during the session (theoretical code 7). It was more common for participants 
to feel they needed to intentionally access the rescript, however, it did also occur 
automatically for some. Participants found that the same rescript was sometimes 
automatically accessed and sometimes intentionally accessed. Furthermore, the same 
participants also experienced both automatic and intentional accessing of the rescript, 
dependant on the memory.  
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“those two are together [the trauma memory and the rescript], it is not just oh I’m 
going to be positive and think of this other, it’s like oh those two just go together now 
(…) or some of them I have to kind of actively remember the rescript (…) there’s just 
some that are just much stronger for whatever reason” (P5). 
 
8.1. Automatically accessing the rescript. Six participants described the 
rescript being automatically accessed, without having to intentionally retrieve it, and 
that this could occur when they were feeling particularly fearful or stuck. However, as 
mentioned, some participants for whom the rescripts came to mind automatically 
described also having to intentionally access the rescript at other times. 
 
“When I’m [by] myself like um the power [rescript] comes sometimes, it’s when I’m 
really stuck like then it comes itself you know because I had it like many times and 
then it’s something like maybe it’s coming to you without you knowing” (P4) 
 
“rather than the intrusion from the memory coming back in that situation, what I 
found was that the rescript was coming in” (P10) 
 
“Either can happen, they either come automatically or sometimes there’s sort of a 
moment, you know, when there’s sort of a moment and you manage to do that” (P9) 
 
However, the two participants who described an experience of the rescript feeling like 
it had changed elements of the original traumatic memory (focused code 7.1) found 
that the rescript was consistently automatically accessed. One participant in particular 
expressed that certain rescripts were always there when the traumatic memory was 
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retrieved, as they had a “better association” (P5). This participant clarified that 
although the facts of the memory remained, the rescripted ending was always present. 
 
“the most powerful one is that one I described to you where I just had that real 
revelation, I now hold that, like that is now really strongly associated with that 
memory so whenever I think, if that was to pop into my head I would always think of 
that ending” (P5) 
 
Importantly, it should be noted that when a rescript occurred automatically it was not 
possible to clearly ascertain what had occurred to the underlying memory 
representations during the ImRs session. For example, it is possible that the original 
traumatic memory had changed or that a new memory had been created that was 
always more accessible, linked with a better association. 
 
8.2. Intentionally accessing the rescript. Nearly all participants discussed 
having to intentionally access the rescript when the traumatic memory was triggered, 
“some of them I have to kind of actively remember the rescript” (P5). 
 
“I think about the traumatic ones first and then I choose to bring in the other memory, 
the rescripted one where (…) it’s like a safety net” (P6) 
 
“it’s kind of like it’s swimming around in my head and if I can grab it, it, then it’s 
better that I have a better ending“ (P2) 
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Participants discussed tuning in to and focusing on the new rescript, with the 
informed knowledge that not doing this, would be detrimental for their well-being, 
“it’s almost like a safe haven and I know that if I can get to that that the rest of it will 
stop” (P2). One participant described their thought processes behind choosing the 
rescript, over the traumatic memory, to feel less distressed. 
 
“you know what you are going to do if you touch a burning plate [the traumatic 
memory] so that’s ok don’t touch the burning, you know what it is, so why do you 
have to force your hand to touch the plate” (P7) 
 
Some participants suggested that the original traumatic memory is still present, but 
now they have an option of accessing something less distressing, “your bad memories 
never go, you can never change them, but at the same time you can think of a newer 
one” (P6). 
 
Participants also discussed that in addition to individual factors that affect accessing 
the rescript (e.g., mood, motivation, setting) the rescript itself had to be available, to 
be able to be accessed. The participants that discussed this generally found whether 
the rescript was available could be outside their control.  
 
“It can vary really because as I say sometimes he will go away and I won’t be able to 
get him [the rescript]” (P1) 
 
“It has to arrive, I can’t force it (…) it just there, it just appears in my mind” (P2) 
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8.3. Change in accessibility and strength of the rescript over time. Overall 
participants found that the rescripts became more accessible over time. Even 
participants who had recently completed an ImRs session described a change over a 
limited time. Rehearsing the rescript was found to increase accessibility (focused code 
9.1). 
 
“in the beginning I think I would, I would bring her [the rescript] in there but now 
she’s like, she’s there and I just need to realise that she’s there, just yea … that’s 
what I feel like, from now she will be there, like I already put her into that situation 
with me” (P8) 
 
“I mean more recently it seems, I think it has happened with all of them [accessed 
more automatically], it’s started to happen with all of them. In the beginning when I 
started using it, all I can tell you is that it was just happening less” (P9) 
 
Linked to this, participants described the power and impact of the rescript increasing 
over time, which they could foresee continuing. 
 
“It’s something new, it hasn’t, it hasn’t (long pause) it hasn’t matured enough to 
overshadow the whole road but I am enjoying it so I want it, I want it to carry on like 
that” (P7) 
 
“I think more recently, the rescript has felt much stronger (…) I think that shifts over 
time” (P10) 
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9. Enhancing on-going use of ImRs.  
 9.1. Rehearsing the rescript. Participants discussed rehearsing the rescript 
already created in sessions, which appeared to be beneficial for the effectiveness of 
ImRs. Varied reasons were given for the importance of rehearsal, such as repeating 
the rescript increasing its strength, believability, vividness, the ease of access 
(theoretical code 8) and its impact. One participant described having the mind-set that 
practice is essential and motivation to practise was important to alleviate distress 
(focused code 2.5). 
 
“you’d need to just practise it and practise it, in order to really sort of believe that’s 
what’s happened” (P1) 
 
“the more often, the more you do it, at least on average, I mean it doesn’t always 
work the same, the more effective it becomes” (P9) 
 
“I think about it everyday so the memory becomes, becomes second nature” (P6) 
 
One participant, who had completed ImRs the longest ago, shared that it was very 
difficult to rehearse the rescript outside of sessions and so now could not remember it 
clearly. Another participant described the difficulty in rehearsing as it felt different to 
do so at home, than in the supported therapeutic environment. Rehearsing the rescript 
could be linked to the amount of support and guidance an individual needed from the 
therapist in completing the technique (focused code 4.2) 
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“I would try [to rehearse the rescript], but it was very difficult (…) I did try though, I 
tried really hard to, you know, go a different way and sometimes I did and sometimes 
I didn’t” (P2) 
 
9.2. Developing rescripting skills. A slightly different concept discussed was 
participants developing the skills to rescript autonomously. That is, rather than just 
rehearsing the same rescript already created, some participants began to change 
rescripted memories further and/or rescript new memories themselves, outside of 
treatment sessions. One participant shared that it was important to do this because 
new threats/needs could arise in an already rescripted memory at a later time. One 
participant suggested that it took time to develop the skills to do this autonomously. 
There was a wide variation in developing skills, from participants who felt unable to 
do this to those who repeatedly did so, “all the time, now I’ve got it [the skill]” (P7). 
 
“having done it over and over again and all this, it does make it easier, you have to 
sort of train yourself somehow to do it” (P9) 
 
“I would sometimes change what I came up with in the session and like modify it so it 
helps to then reinforce it as well as a memory” (P5) 
 
“you start to make up something about some other ones you know, you haven’t 
touched on yet, yea, that’s what I did as well, I start to sometimes use, make different 
ones up when I had flashbacks about other incidents and things like that (…) this took 
a long time until I started to do this” (P9) 
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9.3. Using rescripting aids. Seven of the 10 participants utilised aids, which 
increased rescripting effectiveness, for example drawings, images on mobile phones 
and physical objects. These were created both in session and at home and were used 
to help create rescripts, to cue visualisation of the rescripts, and one participant found 
them to be ‘grounding’. These were found to be beneficial in continuing to utilise the 
rescripts long-term. One participant discussed how it was helpful to create pictures of 
the rescript for homework.  
 
“I drew him, so he’s quite real to me and would have him sort of dotted about the 
house or wherever just to feel a bit safer” (P1) 
 
“Visualising, because it was in the head and then I was putting it in paper so see what 
was happening” (P7) 
 
9.4. Using the rescripted image more broadly. Interestingly, three participants 
discussed using the rescripted image more generally, for example, as a separate 
compassionate image that could be brought into therapy sessions, other areas of life, 
and even be sent to comfort others. 
 
“I’ve brought him in to my thoughts about when there’s been other stuff going on in 
life … erm … an example I can give you is that recently my erm <individual> has 
been diagnosed with <…> so I sent him to him [the rescript] in my head, just to give 
him a bit of a comfort…so in that sense I’m using him for every day things as well 
(P1) 
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Another participant utilised the rescripted image, as separate from the memory as 
someone to trust, talk to, and understand her. 
 
“It’s like I have a new um friend who I can, I used to talk to myself a lot but now I’m 
not like talking just to myself, I can talk to her and I feel better about it (…) she’s, 
she’s like single like me and she has no-one and she’s genuinely interested in my life 
and what’s going on with me (P8) 
 
Another participant had shared their rescripted image with friends and family to 
enable them to utilise it as a tool to lift their mood. 
 
“I’ve told everybody like my family about it, like even on the phone, (…) and 
everybody’s talking about <rescript> (…) they would just start talking, using these 
characters and talking about them as if they were alive and that also sort of helped 
me to calm down, outside of that rescripting thing (P9) 
 
However, one participant experienced using the rescript as a compassionate image 
resulted in feeling the need to protect and defend the image within traumatic 
memories. This resulted in decreased effectiveness of that image in certain memories. 
 
“there were things that I didn’t want him to see so I couldn’t bring him into my 
memory (…) because it was too awful for him to see” (P1) 
 
9.5. Attitude towards the ImRs technique post ImRs. Participants’ attitudes to 
rescripting following rescripting a memory were largely positive, for example 
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viewing the rescript as a lifeline and treasuring the rescripts. Following the ImRs 
process one participant talked about choosing to think of the rescript to protect the 
positive gains from treatment. 
 
“you feel like when you’re thrown in the water and you just want to come out and if 
you had, there was something you try, stick on it, you just try” (P4) 
 
“I go to a different plane and I treasure them (long pause) I treasure them” (P7) 
 
“I have had treatment … and I don’t want to destroy it (…) I can’t keep on reliving 
those incidences because I have a life to lead now” (P7) 
 
Importantly for on-going rescripting sessions, two participants described positive 
attitudes increasing when early rescripts were successful. Conversely, one participant 
suggested that when rescripting did not work the first time this triggered feelings of 
failure for them. 
 
“So that was very powerful [rescripting success] and I think so then sort of on the 
back of that experience I then was able to trust the process of what we were doing” 
(P5) 
 
“having had the experience of doing the rescripting with the first memory, I knew and 
felt more confident actually that the approach would work in the second” (P10) 
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A Model of the Effectiveness Factors and Mechanisms of Action of ImRs 
Overview. This study aimed to explore the potential mechanisms of action 
and factors that moderated the effectiveness of the ImRs technique and generate a 
theoretical model to increase understanding. The following model, based on 
participants’ accounts, is a diagrammatic representation of concepts that could be 
considered potential mechanisms of action, represented by cogs (theoretical codes 6, 7 
and focused codes 2.6 and 2.7) and effectiveness factors, represented by squares 
(theoretical codes 1, 2 [focused codes 2.1 - 2.5] 3, 4, 5, 8, 9). Arrows demonstrate the 
direction of influence. The effectiveness factors are divided into temporal order of 
pre, during and post an ImRs session. A simplified model is presented in the results 
(Figure 2) and a more detailed model in the Appendices (Appendix 14). 
 
Mechanisms of action. Potential mechanisms of action, represented by cogs, 
included a change in felt sense (theoretical code 6) and a change in memory 
representations (theoretical code 7) as the two main mechanisms of action. 
Metacognitive insight (focused code 2.6) and self-efficacy (focused code 2.7) were 
also proposed as potential mechanisms of action, although less evidence for these 
emerged from the data. 
 
Effectiveness factors. Factors that moderated the effectiveness of ImRs, 
represented by squares, began with those relevant before the rescripting session 
commences. These included, ‘factors preceding ImRs’ (theoretical code 1), including 
the nature of the trauma memory (focused code 1.1), attitudes towards treatment and 
change (focused code 1.2) and attitudes towards the ImRs technique specifically 
(focused code 1.3). 
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Factors that moderated the effectiveness of ImRs at the time of the rescripting session 
included ‘individual differences’ (theoretical code 2), such as imagery ability (focused 
code 2.1), ability to believe in the rescript (focused code 2.2), an individual’s mood 
(focused code 2.3), their level of dissociation (focused code 2.4) and their level of 
motivation (focused code 2.5). Further effectiveness moderators at this time were 
linked to the structure of therapy and where ImRs fell within that, ‘the importance of 
the therapeutic structure’ (theoretical code 3). This included the timing of ImRs 
within the treatment process (focused code 3.1), when the rescript began within the 
original traumatic memory (focused code 3.2) and combining ImRs with other 
therapeutic techniques (focused code 3.3). Factors related to the therapist also 
moderated the effectiveness of ImRs, ‘the importance of the therapist’ (theoretical 
code 4). This included the level of trust participants had in them at the time of the 
rescripting session (focused code 4.1), the level of support and guidance received 
during the ImRs sessions (focused code 4.2) and utilising the therapist’s presence in 
the rescript (focused code 4.3). Finally, aspects of the rescript itself were found to 
moderate effectiveness, ‘creating an effective rescript’ (theoretical code 5). This 
included levels of agency in choosing the rescript (focused code 5.1), optimal 
vividness (focused code 5.2) and optimal perspective (focused code 5.3). 
 
Factors that moderated the effectiveness of ImRs after a rescripting session included 
‘long-term accessibility of the rescript’ (theoretical code 8), which included 
automatically accessing the rescript (focused code 8.1), intentionally accessing the 
rescript (focused code 8.2) and a change in accessibility and strength of the rescript 
over time (focused code 8.3). This theoretical code was a result of memory change 
during rescripting which influenced later accessibility. However, this theoretical code 
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also had a bidirectional relationship with memory change, as accessing the rescript 
following creation, through rehearsal (focused code 9.1), promoted on-going memory 
change. The arrow extending directly to memory change represents that participants 
linked this theoretical code to this mechanism of action specifically. Participants 
suggested that ‘enhancing on-going use of rescripting’ (theoretical code 9), including 
rehearsing the rescript (focused code 9.1), developing skills (focused code 9.2) and 
using aids (focused code 9.3), increased the effectiveness of ImRs over time. Again, 
the arrow extending directly to memory change represents that participants linked this 
theoretical code to this mechanism of action specifically. Some participants found that 
utilising the rescripted image more broadly, for example outside of the traumatic 
memory, was beneficial and alleviated distress (focused code 9.4).  
 
Importantly, a feedback loop was suggested which related to future rescripts, rather 
than the rescript just created. For example if participants developed rescripting skills 
(focused code 9.2), this increased their self-efficacy with the technique (focused code 
2.7), and increased the likelihood of them rescripting again in the future, due to 
having positive attitudes towards ImRs (focused code 1.3). Similarly, feeling positive 
about the rescripts generated and experiencing less distress because of them (focused 
code 9.5) increased the effectiveness of the next rescript, again by improving attitudes 
before the next rescripting session (focused code 1.3). This feedback loop 
demonstrated that ImRs should be considered an iterative process, with the 
effectiveness of one rescript affecting the next, and so on. It is also highly likely that 
the effectiveness of one rescript will link to theoretical codes present at the time of 
rescripting directly, such as ‘individual differences’ (theoretical code 2) and ‘creating 
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an effective rescript’ (theoretical code 5) (see Appendix 14). However it was felt there 
were insufficient data generated regarding this to include within the model.  
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Figure 2.  
A model demonstrating the potential mechanisms of action and effectiveness factors of ImRs. 	
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
 
Whilst research demonstrating the efficacy of ImRs for PTSD is accumulating (Arntz, 
2012), there is still a lack of research regarding its mechanisms of action or factors 
that moderate its effectiveness. The aims of this study, therefore, were to explore 
individuals’ experiences of ImRs in the treatment of PTSD, to determine factors that 
influenced its effectiveness, and consider potential mechanisms of action, relative to 
what is suggested by existing theory. A model is proposed (Figure 2) aiming to 
increase the theoretical understanding of ImRs, and so in turn, increase clinical 
effectiveness. 
 
Overview of Findings 
Nine theoretical codes were generated which included both potential mechanisms of 
action and factors that moderated the effectiveness of ImRs. The theoretical codes 
suggested as potential mechanisms of action were ‘memory change mechanisms’ 
(theoretical code 7), ‘felt sense change mechanisms’ (theoretical code 6) and the 
focused codes of ‘metacognitive insight’ (focused code 2.6) and ‘level of self-
efficacy’ (focused code 2.7). Effectiveness factors were grouped into an approximate 
temporal order, including factors present before an ImRs session, at the point of an 
ImRs session, and after an ImRs session, although it is acknowledged that there will 
inevitably be overlap between these stages. These factors included: ‘factors preceding 
ImRs’ (theoretical code 1), ‘individual differences’ (focused codes 2.1 - 2.5), ‘the 
importance of therapeutic structure’ (theoretical code 3), ‘the importance of the 
therapist’ (theoretical code 4), ‘creating an effective rescript’ (theoretical code 5), 
‘long-term accessibility of the rescript’ (theoretical code 8) and ‘enhancing on-going 
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use of ImRs’ (theoretical code 9). It should be considered that the concept of 
effectiveness factors and mechanisms of action were part of the study rationale, not 
participants’ suggestions, therefore determining which factors came under which 
category was subject to the researcher’s interpretation of the data. 
 
Research Questions  
What are the potential fundamental mechanisms of action of ImRs?  
Memory change mechanism (theoretical code 7). All participants reported 
experiencing memory change of some form due to ImRs. This was considered an 
underlying mechanism of action, however was closely linked to the later accessibility 
of the memory representation (theoretical code 8). The majority of participants felt 
that during ImRs a new, less distressing memory had been created, resulting in the 
sense of two memories existing, the original traumatic memory and the rescripted 
memory (focused code 7.2). This is in line with the dual representation theory of 
memory (Brewin et al., 1996; Brewin et al., 2010). Brewin et al. (2010) proposed that 
during ImRs, the C-rep of the intrusive memory/image is retrieved, the content of the 
associated S-reps accessed, and then contextualised with the C-rep. This process 
creates a new, elaborated C-rep, which includes both negative, and positive and novel 
information. If this is successful, when this new C-rep is retrieved positive emotions 
and sensations will be retrieved from S-memory, alleviating distress. Participants’ 
experiences of accessibility of the rescript were particularly relevant in relation to the 
competition between two memory representations.  
 
Alternatively, two participants felt that the original traumatic memory itself had 
changed due to ImRs, rather than a new, alternative memory created (focused code 
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7.1). For example, one participant discussed the trauma memory being “rewritten” 
(P5) or permanently changed. If change to the original memory representation had 
occurred, this is in line with theories suggesting ImRs works through ‘UCS-
revaluation’, that is, a change in meaning of the original US, the traumatic event 
(Arntz, 2011; Arntz, 2012; Arntz & Weertman, 1999). Arntz (2014) suggested that if 
the meaning has changed, a reminder would result in the new memory representation 
being accessed, along with decreased distress, as was the case with some participants. 
This fits with Lane et al.’s (2015) proposal that therapeutic change occurs by 
“activating old memories and their associated emotions, and introducing new 
emotional experiences in therapy enabling new emotional elements to be incorporated 
into that memory trace via reconsolidation” (p.3). Ecker (2015) highlighted that for 
reconsolidation to occur, not only does the memory representation need to be 
activated, but a mismatch of prediction error experience must also exist. It is possible 
that a rescript could act as that mismatch. However, a debate regarding 
reconsolidation is on-going, as recent research with humans demonstrated that after 
retrieving a memory, reconsolidation of new learning did not occur (Hardwicke, Tagi, 
& Shanks, 2016). It is clear that further research is needed, as if ImRs works through 
reconsolidation, this could result in change that endures multiple contexts, possibly 
decreasing the chance of relapse. 
 
However, it is not straightforward to determine the underlying change to memory 
representations. For example, it should be considered that MTT (Nadel & 
Moscovitch, 1997; Moscovitch & Nadel, 1999) would suggest that even if the original 
traumatic memory has been changed, many other traces of this memory remain. 
While Lane et al. (2015) suggested that it is conceivable that following 
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reconsolidation the original memory and associated emotions could no longer be 
retrievable, Arntz (2012) proposed that the facts of the original event would remain. 
This raises the question of whether this could feel like two memories to participants.  
 
Felt sense change mechanism (theoretical code 6). Nearly all participants 
experienced a change to their felt sense through ImRs. This linked to the ideas of an 
interacting cognitive subsystems model (Teasdale, 1997a; 1997b; Teasdale & 
Barnard, 1993), which proposes two levels of meaning of information: 1) specific 
propositional and 2) generic implicational. The theory proposes that content at the 
generic implicational level does not map onto language and includes themes related to 
an individual’s world, body, and mind, summarised as ‘felt sense’. Therefore, 
intellectual (specific propositional) and emotional (generic implicational) beliefs need 
different types of experience to promote change (Bennett-Levy, 2003). Indeed, 
Teasdale and Barnard (1993) suggested that using guided imagery after trauma is in 
line with changing implicational codes. Others have also discussed this idea of a felt 
sense, with Gendlin (1981) describing it as an internal bodily awareness or sense of 
meaning. Interestingly, participants in this study generally did not experience ImRs to 
have changed their cognitions, rather their emotions. It has previously been suggested 
that ImRs could be more effective than other CBT approaches in addressing beliefs 
resistant to rational reasoning, rather those experienced on a feeling level (Cooper et 
al., 2007). 
 
Participants experienced changes to key emotions due to ImRs (focused code 6.1). 
One participant described releasing their anger through the rescript, which is in line 
with the suggestion that rescripting satisfies rather than suppresses anger (Arntz, 
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2014). Another participant felt “liberated” (P7) from a long-standing sense of guilt. 
This finding fits with research demonstrating ImRs to result in better outcomes for 
emotions such as anger, hostility and guilt, than IE alone (Arntz et al., 2007). 
Participants also experienced sadness and grief, for example, due to the knowledge 
that what the rescript represents was absent during the trauma. Arntz (2014) suggested 
that following ImRs a mourning process is natural and healthy and should be 
validated and supported by the therapist. These varied changes to participants 
emotions make sense when considering research demonstrating the strong effect that 
imagery has on emotions (Holmes et al., 2008; Holmes & Mathews, 2010). 
 
Participants also experienced their feeling states changing, in varying ways (focused 
code 6.2). One example was participants experiencing an increased feeling of comfort 
and compassion through the rescripts. Creating compassionate rescripts has been 
demonstrated to be beneficial, in treatment for depression (Wheatley et al., 2007; 
Wheatley & Hackmann, 2011) and with childhood memories (Wild et al., 2008). It is 
likely that incorporating compassion into rescripts in PTSD treatment more generally 
will be beneficial, as PTSD can be characterised by critical thoughts and an inability 
to self-soothe (Lee, 2005). Research has demonstrated compassion work to be 
beneficial when treating PTSD, particularly with emotions such as shame (Lee, 2005; 
2009). However, it has been suggested that not having compassionate examples to 
draw on can cause difficulties when creating a compassionate image (Gilbert & 
Procter, 2006). This was particularly relevant for one participant who could not recall 
being cared for as a child and therefore found creating a compassionate rescript 
difficult. This should be closely considered during ImRs sessions. 
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Participants also completed behavioural urges during rescripting that were not 
possible at the time of the trauma (focused code 6.3). This included gaining revenge 
and punishing perpetrators, destroying items that had caused the most distress, 
completing appropriate cultural practices after someone had died, and escaping the 
traumatic scene. Completing these behavioural urges appeared to alleviate emotional 
distress. Arntz (2014) suggested that it could be healing to express actions through 
imagery that were prohibited at the time of the trauma to ensure survival (Edwards, 
2007). Arntz (2011) also proposed that ImRs is not about “what is logically and 
empirically true, but what the individual feels and needs” (p.479), and meeting these 
needs could result in cognitive and emotional processing (Arntz, 2011). An alternative 
view to explain the benefits of completing behavioural urges in ImRs is that to 
alleviate distress, an individual must pass through the immobility response occurring 
during trauma, to become mobile and functional again (Levine, 1997). This raises the 
question of whether this could be achieved through mental imagery, considering 
research demonstrating the overlap between perceiving and imagining (Ganis et al., 
2004). 
 
Change to metacognitive insight and level of self-efficacy (focused codes 2.6 
and 2.7). Other potential mechanisms of action were an increase in metacognitive 
insight and self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977; Flavell, 1979). Some participants developed 
insight that control over their memories was possible by creating an alternative 
ending. Participants’ belief in their ability to do so varied. Further benefits were 
evident if this ability extended from the traumatic memory being rescripted to other 
traumatic memories and distressing thought processes more generally. 	
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Research has already highlighted the importance of metacognition and self-efficacy in 
PTSD treatment. A metacognitive approach has been developed, which focuses less 
on conventional reliving of the trauma and modifying cognitions, and more on 
promoting a more adaptive thinking and behavioural style (Wells, 2000; Wells & 
Sembi, 2004). This is in line with Brewin’s (2006) suggestion that negative thinking 
does not need to be corrected, but disengaged from. Furthermore, Benight and 
Bandura (2004) suggested perceived self-efficacy of coping to be a key mediator of 
recovery following a traumatic event. They proposed ‘thought control efficacy’, 
linked to the idea that what is detrimental to emotional well-being is not the frequency 
of anxious cognitions but the inability to control them. Therefore, increasing control 
over trauma memories and thought processes through rescripting will alleviate 
distress. Similarly, Salter (2014) found that individuals who experienced a sense of 
control over their images felt less distressed. Participants in this study also found that 
they gained a sense of power and control within the rescripts (focused code 6.2), 
which could further contribute to positive beliefs about control. Research has shown 
that imagining mastery over threats builds coping self-efficacy (Bandura, Adams, 
Hardy, & Howells, 1980). Research has suggested that the sense of control gained 
through rescripting might then be utilised more broadly, resulting in further positive 
emotions and outcomes (Rusch et al., 2000). Importantly, one participant did find that 
this sense of control in the rescript extended to life more generally. This is a long-
term beneficial outcome of ImRs and likely to be important to promote in therapy. 
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What factors create an effective rescript? 
Pre ImRs session.  
Factors preceding ImRs (theoretical code 1). Participants suggested that 
characteristics of the trauma memory, such as the time since the trauma, the level of 
distress, and the completeness of the memory, affected ImRs (focused code 1.1). 
Mixed findings exist regarding the effect of time since the trauma on treatment 
outcomes, with some research suggesting the longer ago the trauma, the worse the 
outcome (Duffy et al., 2007; Ehlers et al., 2013) and other research finding no effect 
(Ehlers et al., 2005). While the nature of the memory was not discussed in relation to 
a specific theory of memory change, animal research has demonstrated boundaries of 
reconsolidation (Dudai, 2006), whereby older and stronger memories are less 
amenable to reconsolidation (Eisenberg & Dudai, 2004; Suzuki et al., 2004). In line 
with this, Brewin (2015) suggested that effects of reconsolidation might not occur 
with memories that people have “recalled and perhaps ruminated over dozens if not 
hundreds of times” (p.21). However, to the author’s knowledge, the longevity of the 
trauma memory has not yet been examined in relation to ImRs outcomes.  
 
Participants also suggested that a positive attitude to treatment, change, and the ImRs 
technique itself increased ImRs effectiveness, which makes intuitive sense (focused 
codes 1.2 and 1.3). These findings fit with the long-standing theory of stages of 
change (Prochaska & DiClemente, 1983; 1986), demonstrating an association 
between readiness to change and therapeutic outcomes. Furthermore, ten Napel-
Shultz et al. (2011) interviewed individuals with a diagnosis of PD regarding 
preparatory imagery techniques for ImRs. They found that participants felt unclear 
about the explanation of imagery work initially, which increased their anxieties. Salter 
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(2014) suggested that ImRs was less effective when individuals were reluctant to 
introduce change. 
 
During ImRs session.  
Individual differences (theoretical code 2). Participants discussed multiple 
individual differences that moderated the effectiveness of ImRs. A high level of 
ability in imagining the rescript was felt to increase effectiveness (focused code 2.1). 
In line with this, previous research has suggested a low visualisation ability to be a 
barrier to imagery techniques (ten Napel-Shultz et al., 2011). Research has shown trait 
differences in imagery ability (Reisberg, Pearson, & Kosslyn, 2003) and a clear link 
has been demonstrated between mental images and emotion (Holmes et al., 2008; 
Holmes and Matthews, 2010). It is possible, therefore, that those with high imagery 
abilities could experience stronger positive emotional experiences during ImRs.  
 
Being able to believe in the rescript was also found to increase ImRs effectiveness 
(focused code 2.2). Previous research has suggested that if participants were unable to 
relate to a rescript because it was not believable, they were unlikely to experience a 
reduction in symptoms, although this was not examined statistically (Salter, 2014; 
Medin, 2015). This could be due to the emotional change in the rescript not being 
believed and therefore it not updating the original emotion experienced at the time of 
the trauma. Some participants found that they believed in a realistic rescript and 
others in a rescript not possible within the constraints of time and space. This fits with 
existing suggestions that therapists give individuals the choice of what the rescripts 
should include, with the possibility of using something completely surreal. 
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Low mood was found to compromise the effectiveness of ImRs (focused code 2.3) by 
diminishing an individual’s ability to complete ImRs initially and to later access the 
rescript, which then led to further low mood. Variable effects have been found of low 
mood on PTSD treatment, with some research suggesting a detrimental effect (Duffy 
et al., 2007; Ehlers et al., 2013) and others not finding this (Ehlers et al., 2005). Ehlers 
et al. (2013) suggested that low mood may only moderate treatment outcomes if it is 
so severe that it affects activity levels and motivation to complete tasks between 
sessions, which might then need to be addressed prior to commencing ImRs. 
 
A high level of dissociation was reported as decreasing the effectiveness of ImRs 
(focused code 2.4). Dissociation currently has no clear definition (Spitzer, Barnow, 
Freyberger, & Grabe, 2006) but has been conceptualised as an evolutionary based 
mechanism, adaptive at the time of the trauma (Schauer & Elbert, 2010). Arntz (2011) 
suggested that dissociation can be a barrier to ImRs by preventing information 
processing, for example, by preventing the fear network being activated and new 
information being incorporated (Foa & Kozack, 1986; Foa et al., 1989). However, it 
has been suggested that dissociation during ImRs tends to reduce over time (Arntz & 
Weermtan, 1999). Conversely, research has also shown that high levels of 
dissociation did not impede an exposure-based treatment for PTSD (Hagenaars, van 
Minnen, & Hoogduin, 2010). This is in line with one participant who did not find 
dissociation to be a problem when rescripting. 
 
Importantly, participants also found that they needed a high level of motivation to 
change the ending, to believe the rescript, and to practise the rescript at home 
(focused code 2.5). Needing a high level of motivation was closely linked to attitudes 
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prior to ImRs (focused codes 1.2 and 1.3) but was particularly relevant during a 
rescripting session. Unsurprisingly, Salter (2014) also found that being motivated and 
engaged with ImRs increased effectiveness. 
 
The importance of the therapeutic structure (theoretical code 3). Participants 
felt that conducting ImRs in the latter stages of treatment increased effectiveness, due 
to feeling more ready for the technique (focused code 3.1). Furthermore, they felt that 
ImRs should follow ‘reliving’ of the memory through IE. Participants felt ‘reliving’ 
was important to achieve a complete memory, to not deny reality, and to gain extra 
knowledge to use during ImRs. It is possible that completing IE first would decrease 
distress and promote a less fragmented memory (Hackmann, 2011), which could in 
turn increase ImRs effectiveness (focused code 1.1). Research has found IE, and IE 
and ImRs combined, were equally effective in reducing PTSD symptoms (Arntz et al., 
2007). While this study did not demonstrate any extra benefit of ImRs on PTSD 
symptoms, no research has yet compared IE and ImRs, and ImRs alone. However, 
other research has demonstrated ImRs to be an effective stand-alone technique, 
without a specific IE component (Arntz et al., 2013; Raabe et al., 2015).  
 
Linked to this, participants viewed ImRs as part of a treatment package, feeling 
therapeutic change occurred due to a combination of techniques, not solely ImRs 
(focused code 3.3). Some participants suggested that work with cognitions was also 
important and could also be used to enhance the rescript. Perhaps planning the 
rescript first, to target maladaptive cognitions and include previous cognitive work, 
could aid this (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), rather than a more ‘in vivo’ approach (Arntz & 
Weertman, 1999). However, to the author’s knowledge, no research yet exists that 
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compares these two preparation approaches to rescripting. Also related to viewing 
ImRs as part of a larger set of techniques was one participant’s sense that it was 
important to address the person as a whole and not just the memory. It is likely, 
particularly with more ‘complicated’ or ‘complex’ PTSD presentations, this may 
require more than just ImRs. However, it should be considered that these preferences 
were in line with participants’ treatment. It is unlikely that they would be able to 
compare this with ImRs as a stand-alone technique, to decide upon a preference, 
without experiencing both.  
 
Where the traumatic memory should begin to be changed, that is, when the rescript 
should begin, varied by individual preference (focused code 3.2). Some participants 
would have liked support from the rescript earlier, more in line with ‘pre-emptive’ 
rescripting ideas (Arntz et al., 2013; Arntz & Weertman, 1999). Some participants felt 
it was relevant to rescript just before the worst moment, in line with the ‘warning 
signal’ hypothesis (Ehlers et al., 2002). This hypothesis suggests that intrusions are 
from stimuli present moments before the moment with the largest emotional impact, 
for example, stimuli if experienced again would suggest impending danger. Finally, 
some participants reported needing to relive the worst moments before rescripting to 
achieve a contrast between bad and good, with the bad enhancing the good. Clearly, it 
is important for therapists to carefully formulate what would be most beneficial 
before commencing rescripting. There are multiple clinical factors to consider, such 
as sufficient memory activation, whether an individual can tolerate exposure to the 
memory, and possibly unexpected timing of the rescript, as this could promote 
reconsolidation (Ecker, 2015; Finnie & Nadar, 2012). 
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The importance of the therapist (theoretical code 4). Participants felt that a 
high level of trust in the therapist increased ImRs effectiveness (focused code 4.1). 
This is unsurprising considering a wealth of research highlighting the importance of 
the therapeutic relationship in increasing treatment effectiveness (Horvath & 
Luborsky, 1993; Gilbert & Leahy, 2007; Lambert & Barley, 2001). This is likely to 
be particularly relevant when working with PTSD, as the nature of the traumatic event 
may have led individuals to find it difficult to establish trust, and creating a safe 
environment to process traumatic memories is essential (Courtois, 2004). This 
suggests therefore that the timing of ImRs in treatment is important (focused code 
3.1), as trust needs to be established before commencing the technique. Brewin et al. 
(2009) anecdotally suggested this to be important when using ImRs.  
 
Participants varied in the amount of support and guidance they required for ImRs to 
be effective (focused code 4.2). As would be expected, participants wanted the 
therapist’s support with rescripting, which increased effectiveness. Clinically 
therapists would support individuals outside of the memory in making decisions 
regarding what and when to rescript, and within the memory, with questions 
regarding the individual’s senses, emotions, cognitions and needs (Arntz & 
Weertman, 1999). However, some participants suggested that they felt unable to 
complete ImRs outside of therapy sessions without guidance from the therapist, 
clearly linking to self-efficacy as a mechanism of action (focused code 2.7) and a 
decrease in ImRs effectiveness. This balance is something to consider clinically, 
aiming to both support the individual and facilitate the on-going use of ImRs outside 
of sessions. 
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Linked to this, some participants also felt supported by using the therapist in the 
rescript itself (focused code 4.3). Certain participants wanted the therapist to be 
present in the rescript and for them to take more of a leading role in making changes. 
Arntz (2012) suggested that whether the individual or a trusted other rescripts needs 
to be explored further and may depend on the type of person and type of memory. 
This is important to consider as Salter (2014) suggested that individuals who instigate 
change themselves have the greatest decrease in symptoms. One participant for whom 
the therapist acted as a force of change in the rescript specifically mentioned that they 
were rescripting a childhood memory. Research has suggested the importance of the 
therapist providing support and care in the rescript when rescripting childhood 
memories (Arntz, 2011). This is because following childhood experiences, certain 
individuals may be unable to be able to provide this care for themselves, due to the 
lack of adaptive schemas (Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003). However, the therapist 
being present in the rescript and intervening has also been used with traumas 
occurring in adulthood (e.g., Arntz et al., 2013). Clarity regarding when it is most 
beneficial for the therapist to intervene in the rescript is required. 
 
Creating an effective rescript (theoretical code 5). Particularly when 
rescripting traumatic events that occurred in adulthood, participants highlighted the 
importance of considering and choosing the change themselves (focused code 5.1). 
Arntz and Weertman (1999) found that individuals can “more easily discard the 
corrective actions of others” (p.724) and self-generated ideas have been suggested to 
be more believable than those generated by others (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). One 
participant discussed how the association between the original traumatic memory and 
the rescript increased if they created a rescript with personal meaning. 
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Participants generally found that the more vivid the rescript the more effective it was 
(focused code 5.2). There are multiple factors that could explain the importance of 
creating a vivid rescript. Firstly, research has shown that the more vivid an image the 
easier it is to recall (Cornoldi et al., 1992) and that the more something is recalled, the 
easier it is to do so in the future (Tversky & Khaneman, 1973). This is likely to create 
a more accessible image that wins retrieval competition over the traumatic memory 
(Brewin, 2006) or potentially a more powerful reconsolidated memory. Secondly, 
other therapeutic techniques, such as EMDR and the ‘cognitive vaccine’ (Holmes et 
al., 2009; 2010), propose that their effectiveness could rely on the limited capacity of 
working memory (Baddeley, 2000; 2003). Therapeutic techniques that use visuo-
spatial working memory resources compete for resources with traumatic visuo-spatial 
images, thereby disrupting them. Indeed, tasks needing working memory resources 
have been shown to disrupt the vividness of negative autobiographical images 
(Andrade et al., 1997). Furthermore, vivid images have rich and detailed sensory 
representation in visuo-spatial and auditory working memory (Baddeley & Andrade, 
1988). It is possible, therefore, that the more vivid the image, the more resources it 
uses, and the more it disrupts the traumatic memory. One participant suggested that if 
more than one sense was used, so was more “brain power” (ID9), moving them away 
from the original trauma memory. The same participant found that over time the 
rescript became more vivid than the trauma memory. Multiple participants suggested 
that utilising as many senses as possible in the rescript increased a sense of vividness. 
This is in line with research suggesting that a vivid image “is one that comprises a 
rich array of quasi-sensory information” (Baddeley & Andrade, 1998). Using 
different senses in the rescript may be favourable as intrusive images in PTSD also 
include multiple senses (Ehlers & Steil, 1995). One participant suggested that if 
	 135	
flashbacks were predominantly of a touch sense, a rescript incorporating touch would 
be particularly beneficial. 
 
Participants had varied experiences of the rescript being in field and observer 
perspective (focused code 5.3). Using a field perspective appeared to be preferred as it 
was more intense, participants felt more in control, and were enabled to be the one to 
make changes in the rescript. McIsaac and Eich (2004) found that traumatic memories 
viewed from a field perspective, as opposed to an observer perspective, included more 
emotional, physical and psychological reactions. Moreover, 89% of their participants 
who used an observer perspective commented that they did so to decrease the horror 
of the trauma. This suggests that during ImRs a field perspective allows individuals to 
activate the trauma memory, to enable emotional processing to occur (Rachman, 
1980). Brewin et al. (2010) suggested that field and observer perspectives have 
different neural representations and suggested that an observer perspective makes it 
less likely an S-rep would be activated. Without this activation the S-rep will be 
unable to be processed. This poses the question therefore of whether new emotions or 
a shift in existing emotions are more keenly felt if a field perspective is adopted in the 
image. 
 
Post ImRs session.  
Long-term accessibility of the rescript (theoretical code 8). Following 
memory change during an ImRs session (theoretical code 7) participants described the 
subsequent accessibility of the rescript. This was a bidirectional relationship however, 
as the more participants reported accessing the rescripts (focused code 9.1), the more 
accessible and strong they became, thereby increasing memory change over time. 
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It is important to consider what participants’ experiences of accessibility suggest 
regarding different theories of memory change. Many participants discussed having to 
retrieve the rescript intentionally and, if unsuccessful, experienced the trauma 
memory (although in a less distressing form). Generally, participants found that the 
rescripts were available to be intentionally accessed, although this was not always the 
case. Some participants found that the same rescript was sometimes automatically 
accessed and other times had to be intentionally retrieved. These experiences all 
suggest the existence of two memory representations, the original traumatic memory 
and the rescript, in line with the dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 1996; 
Brewin et al., 2010). The retrieval competition hypothesis (Brewin, 2006) suggests 
that as participants had to intentionally access the rescripts, they were not yet 
accessible enough to win retrieval competition over the trauma memory/original S-rep 
(Dibbets & Arntz, 2015), in the presence of cues that trigger the trauma memory 
(Hackmann, 2011). The possibility of retrieving rescripts over memories from the past 
could be linked to the overlapping neural mechanisms between remembering the past 
and imagining the future (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). However, as previously 
mentioned, it is possible that even if a memory has been reconsolidated other memory 
traces exist and it is those that are being accessed (Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997, 
Moscovitch & Nadel, 1999). 
 
The retrieval competition hypothesis (Brewin, 2006) suggests that therapeutic change 
occurs by ensuring negative representations are rarely retrieved, and if they are that 
they are quickly replaced with more positive representations, which should be assisted 
to win retrieval competition. Brewin et al. (2010) suggested that multiple re-scripting 
scenarios might have to be undergone to create a C-rep that can both neutralise 
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negative emotions from the trauma and be more accessible than the original S-rep. It 
is important, therefore, to consider the multiple factors that increase the accessibility 
of a memory representation, particularly as the old representations are likely to be 
well rehearsed (Wheatley & Hackmann, 2011). It has been suggested that one of the 
primary factors to consider is rehearsal (Brewin, 2006; Wheatley et al., 2007) 
(focused code 9.1). In addition, the memorability and positivity of the rescript could 
be important in increasing accessibility (Wheatley et al., 2007).  
 
Alternatively, if the rescript was always automatically accessed and distress 
alleviated, as was the case for a small number of participants, it is more complicated 
to ascertain the underlying memory theory. For example, the memory representation 
may have been changed, resulting in the new changed meaning always being accessed 
(Arntz, 2012) (focused code 7.1). Alternatively, a new, less distressing memory may 
have been created that was then consistently more accessible (focused code 7.2) 
(Brewin et al., 1996; Brewin et al., 2010). Other research has also found this 
automatic accessibility following ImRs, with participants experiencing difficulties 
retrieving only the original traumatic memory, without the rescript, following ImRs 
(Rusch et al., 2000). Clearly, it is not straightforward to differentiate between retrieval 
competition and reconsolidation accounts of memory change, particularly if the 
factual representations of the traumatic event remain intact even when the meaning 
has fundamentally changed (Arntz, 2012). This study did suggest that a limited 
number of participants experienced change to the original memory, however, future 
research must clarify the underlying mechanisms of memory change further. 
 
	 138	
Enhancing continued use of ImRs (theoretical code 9). Participants 
highlighted the importance of rehearsing the rescript (focused code 9.1) to enable it to 
grow in accessibility and strength (focused code 8.3). As mentioned, a key factor in 
increasing accessibility of a memory representation is rehearsal (Brewin, 2006; 
Wheatley et al., 2007). Often in clinical sessions individuals are advised to listen back 
to the rescript between sessions (Smucker et al., 1995) and these results suggest that 
this should be encouraged. The positive effects of rehearsal suggest that the aim is to 
increase the accessibility of a new memory (Brewin, 2006), although rehearsal could 
also be beneficial in increasing accessibility of a reconsolidated memory. Linked with 
this was the finding that nearly all participants found using rescripting ‘aids’ 
beneficial, such as drawings and images on mobile phones of the rescript (focused 
code 9.3). Brewin (2006) proposed that memory representations with a stronger link 
to a retrieval cue are more likely to win retrieval competition. This suggests that 
therapists could consider creating retrieval cues with participants in sessions to 
promote later accessibility of the rescript.  
 
Interestingly, participants also suggested the importance of gaining autonomous 
rescripting skills over time, to be able to make changes themselves outside of sessions 
(focused code 9.2). Some participants had begun to rescript autonomously and were 
finding it very beneficial. One participant shared that this was important as new 
threats/needs could arise in an already rescripted memory at a later time. Arntz (2012) 
highlighted the importance of ensuring all needs are met within the rescript, however, 
threats arising later should also be considered. Largely, ImRs protocols do not specify 
that individuals should be encouraged to autonomously complete rescripts between 
sessions. However, there are exceptions, such as a self-help workbook teaching 
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strategies to address nightmares, based on imagery rehearsal therapy (Krakow & 
Krakow, 2002). However, Krakow suggested that autonomously completing the 
imagery work might only be suitable for those who are less distressed and/or have had 
previous psychotherapy experience (Krakow, 2003). Future research should carefully 
consider whether developing autonomous rescripting skills would be beneficial or 
whether ImRs should largely be completed with therapist support. This is likely to be 
linked to multiple factors, including the individual’s self-efficacy (focused code 2.7). 
 
Participants also discussed using the rescripted image more broadly, separately from 
the originally rescripted memory (focused code 9.4). Participants appeared to be using 
the rescripts in a similar way to the concept of a ‘perfect nurturer’ (Lee, 2005). This 
technique involves imagining a compassionate and soothing image to promote the 
individual feeling compassion and warmth for themselves. Using the rescripts more 
widely was clearly very beneficial for participants. However, one participant felt the 
need to protect the rescript by not allowing the image into future traumatic memories, 
demonstrating a downside of creating a meaningful separate image. 
 
Generally, participants felt positive about the rescripting process after completing it 
(focused code 9.5). Other research examining the experience of imagery techniques 
found that although initially participants had a more negative view of imagery 
techniques, through practising ImRs they understood the procedure, felt less fearful of 
it, and acknowledged its effectiveness (Arntz, 2011; ten Napel-Schutz et al., 2011). 
Importantly, participants suggested that their attitude to future rescripts improved 
once early rescripting was successful. It is important, therefore, to complete ImRs at 
the correct time for an individual within treatment, to avoid any sense of failure 
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ensuing (focused code 3.1). This highlights that ImRs should be considered an 
iterative process, whereby the success of one rescript leads into the next, and so on. 
 
Can links between specific mechanisms of action and effectiveness factors 
be ascertained? Participants generally described effectiveness factors as affecting 
ImRs generally, without linking these to a specific mechanism of action. However, it 
was clear that some effectiveness factors directly affected specific mechanisms of 
action (Appendix 14). As demonstrated in Figure 2 ‘long-term accessibility of the 
rescript’ (theoretical code 8) was a result of ‘memory change mechanism’ (theoretical 
code 7) but, through rehearsal, also moderated memory change over time. Participants 
also suggested that if they depended on a high level of support from the therapist 
(focused code 4.2) this could result in them feeling unable to rehearse the rescript 
(focused code 9.1) or develop skills to rescript (focused code 9.2) outside of sessions. 
This is, therefore, linked to participants’ self-efficacy (focused code 2.7) in 
rescripting. While this study has gone some way to suggest possible mechanisms of 
action of ImRs, it is clear more research is needed, including to clarify which 
effectiveness factors specifically moderate which mechanisms of action. 
 
Strengths 
Originality. This is one of a limited number of studies that has examined the 
potential mechanisms of action and the effectiveness factors of the ImRs technique. 
Salter (2014) and Medin (2015) have done so, however these studies used a case 
series and ‘dismantling’ designs respectively. Furthermore, to the author’s 
knowledge, the only two qualitative studies in the area examined preparatory imagery 
techniques for ImRs (ten Napel-Shultz et al., 2011) and ImRs linked to emotional 
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processing (Agbuis, 1996). This study therefore is the first qualitative study to 
examine the mechanisms of action and effectiveness factors of ImRs. Importantly, 
this is therefore the first model to be generated with the aim of furthering theoretical 
and clinical understanding (Figure 2). It is hoped that learning from individuals who 
have personally experienced ImRs will provide a rich and detailed understanding of 
the technique. 
 
Sample heterogeneity. Another strength of the study was the heterogeneity of 
the sample. Participants were a mix of genders (40% male, 60% female), from 
Western and non-Western cultures, had experienced a different number of traumatic 
events, had experienced traumas of different durations, had varied amounts of time 
pass since the trauma, had experienced a widely varied number of treatment and ImRs 
sessions and were at different stages of the treatment process (40% discharged, 60% 
still in treatment). Although GT aims mainly for the model to be relevant to the 
sample and not representative of a population (Charmaz, 2014; Corbin & Strauss, 
1990) conducting the interviews with such a diverse sample does increase the clinical 
generalisability of the findings. However, all participants had either experienced 
multiple or sustained traumatic events, or single events linked to other traumatic 
events in the past. This is likely to have resulted in a sample with more ‘complicated’ 
presentations of PTSD, including some participants who would meet criteria for 
‘complex’ PTSD. It has been suggested that individuals with ‘complex’ PTSD, have 
been exposed to repeated or prolonged instances of interpersonal trauma, and in 
addition to PTSD symptoms, also have difficulties with self-regulatory capacities 
(Cloitre, Courtois, & Ford, 2012). This could have affected the nature of the traumatic 
memory (focused code 1.1) and resulted in participants having a higher than average 
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number of treatment sessions (NICE, 2005), which should be considered when 
interpreting the findings. 
 
Limitations 
Theoretical sufficiency and theoretical sampling. One of the major 
limitations of the study was not appearing to have reached data saturation, or 
sufficiency (Dey, 1999), in line with a GT methodology (Charmaz, 2014). Wiener 
(2007) suggested that data saturation is a judgement that takes into account situational 
factors surrounding the study, such as having a limited time period. Charmaz (2014) 
suggested that a small study with “modest claims” (p.214) might result in earlier data 
saturation; however, with broad research questions such as those in this study, it 
cannot be claimed that theoretical sufficiency has been obtained in the time available. 
To claim theoretical sufficiency has been reached, a study must have fully adopted 
theoretical sampling to determine whether new information is emerging (Charmaz, 
2014). Theoretical sampling was considered where possible in this study, in relation 
to recruiting those with varied experiences of the effectiveness of ImRs and a range of 
time having elapsed since completing ImRs. However, given more time, there are 
multiple areas in which theoretical sampling could have been used to further saturate 
categories. For example, it would have been informative to recruit further participants 
who rescripted a childhood memory to ascertain if they indeed wanted a higher level 
of support and guidance in therapy (focused code 4.2) and a higher level of therapist 
presence in the rescript (focused code 4.3) and if this then resulted in lower levels of 
self-efficacy (focused code 2.7). This could then have been compared to those 
rescripting traumas occurring in adulthood. Furthermore, there were many areas 
where more interviews would have been beneficial, for example, further exploring 
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memory change more generally and the idea of a break or cut off point in the memory 
more specifically (focused code 7.3). 
 
Quality standards. Quality standards for qualitative research were followed 
throughout the study (Elliot et al., 1999). However, there are limitations in line with 
these that should be considered when interpreting the results. Firstly, regarding 
‘owning your own perspective,’ the researcher wrote a reflective research diary and 
memos throughout the research process (Appendix 6), to ensure subjectivity did not 
unduly influence the codes generated (Charmaz, 2014). However, conducting a 
literature review prior to the interviews increased the likelihood of prior knowledge 
influencing the results (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Moreover, the researcher was 
working in a trauma service throughout the majority of the study, using ImRs 
clinically, and was receiving individual and peer supervision regarding ImRs weekly. 
Despite efforts to prevent existing knowledge and theory from influencing the 
generation of codes, it is possible that this occurred to some extent, particularly 
regarding memory change. Secondly, regarding ‘providing credibility checks’, 
‘coherence’ and ‘resonance with the reader’ the researcher sent a summary of the 
results and the model to participants for feedback prior to the completion of the study. 
Unfortunately, no participants were able to feedback in time for that information to be 
incorporated, potentially affecting the quality of the results.  
 
Study design considerations. There were multiple issues with the design of 
the study that may have influenced the results. Firstly, prior to completing the ImRs 
technique all participants had ‘relived’ the memory using IE. This is routine treatment 
in the service and was an inclusion criterion to ensure all participants had undergone 
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similar treatment prior to interview. However, due to this it is not possible to clearly 
ascertain how much therapeutic change was due to ImRs and how much due to other 
techniques. Secondly, participants’ understanding of the mechanisms of action of 
ImRs was likely to depend somewhat on the rationale provided by therapists in the 
service. This did not appear to have affected the results to a detrimental extent, but 
should be considered when interpreting them. 
 
Clinical Implications 
Numerous clinical implications arose from the findings and a few key ideas will be 
considered here. Possible factors to consider in ImRs sessions are presented in Table 
4, which could differ in future research with a different sample. Firstly, the majority 
of participants discussed the sense that two memories existed following ImRs, and 
they often needed to intentionally access the rescript. This suggests that it would be 
beneficial for therapists to consider making the rescript as accessible as possible, 
perhaps through considering vividness, perspective, memorability, positivity, and 
promoting rehearsal between sessions. Brewin (2006) suggested that therapists should 
explain the role played by unwanted memory representations and aid with strategies 
to limit their activation. Secondly, almost all participants discussed their felt sense 
changing due to rescripting, with less of a focus on cognitive change, although 
cognitions may well have changed as a result (Hackmann et al., 2011). This suggests 
that ImRs should focus on changing the emotion or feeling state associated with the 
traumatic event, rather than directly targeting maladaptive cognitions related to the 
trauma. Thirdly, some participants discussed finding the therapist being present in the 
rescript and deciding upon the change very helpful, whereas others valued deciding 
upon and creating the change themselves. It is likely that the therapist leading the 
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rescript is more beneficial when rescripting childhood memories (Arntz, 2011), but 
not enough interviews were possible within the time constraints to determine factors 
that affected this more clearly. Therefore, it is important for therapists to carefully 
formulate what is most beneficial for the individual before rescripting. 
 
Table 4.  
Possible considerations for therapists when using ImRs. 
 
Possible considerations for therapists when using ImRs 
Before an ImRs session 
Take time to increase understanding of the rationale and promote positive attitudes to 
the ImRs technique 
During an ImRs session 
Aim to create a rescript that is believable to the individual 
Consider the effects of an individual’s mood on rescripting 
Develop strategies to manage dissociation if necessary 
Consider ways to increase motivation: to complete the technique, to believe the 
rescript and to practise at home 
Promote the development of metacognitive insight in rescripting and more generally 
(potential mechanism of action) 
Promote self-efficacy in rescripting and more generally (potential mechanism of 
action) 
Use ImRs in the latter stages of treatment, following reliving 
Formulate what would be the best time for the rescript to begin within the memory 
Combine ImRs with other therapeutic techniques 
Take time to build trust and a safe and supportive environment 
Formulate the most appropriate level of support/guidance for the individual 
Formulate whether a therapist presence in the rescript would be beneficial 
Formulate whether the individual or the therapist should decide on the change 
Create a vivid rescript 
Promote a field perspective in the rescript 
Promote change to an individual’s felt sense through: changing key emotions, 
changing feeling states and completing behavioural urges (potential mechanism of 
action) 
Promote this felt sense change in life more generally 
Promote memory change (potential mechanism of action) 
After an ImRs session 
Promote on-going rehearsal to increase the accessibility of the rescript  
Consider the development of rescripting ‘skills’ 
Use rescripting aids: to create the rescript and to cue the rescript 
Formulate whether it would be beneficial to use the rescripted image more broadly 
Discuss and promote a positive attitude to ImRs following rescripting to encourage 
future rescripts 
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Future Research 
Possible areas for future research have been considered and key areas will be 
discussed here. Firstly, as mentioned when discussing limitations, all participants had 
undergone other therapeutic techniques prior to rescripting. Therefore, it is not 
possible to gain an unconfounded account of change due solely to ImRs. This may be 
more relevant for examining mechanisms of action than effectiveness factors, for 
example, it may be difficult to determine what extent of memory change is due to 
ImRs. A further qualitative study with individuals who are undergoing ImRs as a 
stand-alone treatment for PTSD would be beneficial in removing confounding 
therapeutic factors (Arntz et al., 2013; Raabe et al., 2015). Secondly, participants 
suggested that developing autonomous rescripting skills was important for the 
effectiveness of ImRs. While many ImRs protocols suggest individuals should 
rehearse the rescript (at varying frequencies) (Smucker et al., 1995; Raabe et al., 
2015), to the author’s knowledge, less research has examined promoting the 
development of ‘rescripting skills’ (although see Krakow & Krakow, 2002). Future 
research could examine whether this would only be beneficial for certain individuals, 
the positives and negatives of doing so, how to best implement improving 
autonomous rescripting skills, and the longitudinal effects of doing this over time. 
Thirdly, participants discussed the effects of ImRs generalising to life more broadly. 
This included developing metacognitive insight and self-efficacy regarding changing 
a specific traumatic memory extending to thought processes more generally, and it 
was even alluded to that other aspects of life then felt more controllable. Similarly, 
participants discussed that the feeling experienced in the rescript was felt in life more 
generally, such as less anger and less guilt. Future research could examine how the 
effects of ImRs extend beyond the rescripted memory. Fourthly, as previously 
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mentioned it would be important to delineate further which effectiveness factors relate 
to which mechanisms of action specifically. Furthermore, the categorisation of 
mechanisms of action and effectiveness factors, while arising from the data, is 
inevitably affected by the researcher’s subjectivity. Therefore, future research should 
further explore these concepts in ImRs to compare similarities and differences with 
this initial study. 
 
Personal Reflections 
Reflecting on the researcher’s role is important throughout a GT study. Charmaz 
(2014) suggested, “reflexivity includes examining how the researcher’s interests, 
positions and assumptions influenced his or her inquiry” (p.344). This occurred 
through regularly considering how my personal context may have impacted the data, 
through discussions with supervisors and peers and writing a reflective research diary 
(Appendix 6). 
 
Throughout the interviewing process I was struck by how emotive discussing the 
ImRs technique was for participants, more so than the already emotional interviews I 
had anticipated. I also felt acutely aware that I was asking people to trust me with 
their most personal and distressing thoughts and feelings, having only just met me. At 
times this felt like a fragile situation and I tried hard to manage this, not wanting to 
push people too much but also remaining curious to learn more about their 
experiences. My experience of concurrently working in a trauma service meant it was 
easy to fall into a clinical rather than a research role. This may have led me to ask 
further questions about emotional distress and/or conversely avoid asking certain 
emotive questions, feeling very aware of the limited time in which to complete the 
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research interviews. I attempted to manage this through reflection in research 
supervision and consideration in my reflective research diary. Conversely, some 
clinical skills proved beneficial, such as an awareness of the importance of trust, an 
awareness of how best to manage dissociation, and having a detailed understanding of 
the ImRs technique. This knowledge may have helped participants feel more 
comfortable and able to share their experience. Furthermore, I felt that empathising, 
as I would in a clinical session, was respectful of participants’ experiences (Charmaz, 
2006). 
 
Conducting a GT study for the first time felt overwhelming. The amount of data 
generated, from 10 90-minute interviews, felt extensive to someone inexperienced in 
this area. I constantly felt privileged to learn of peoples’ experiences and during 
writing up the study I felt a weight of responsibility to maintain and express the 
varying views of participants. I frequently considered what their perspective on the 
write-up might be and hoped it would be acceptable to them. This may have lead to 
me being over-inclusive with the information, not yet feeling confident in my 
decisions of which codes to raise to higher categories. I managed this by cross-
checking the codes with the research supervisors, a trainee working in a similar area, 
and ultimately asking the participants themselves. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
In summary, nine theoretical codes and 34 focused codes emerged from the 10 
interviews conducted. The results suggested potential mechanisms of action of ImRs 
to be change to an individual’s memory representations, change to their felt sense and 
change to their metacognitive insight and self-efficacy. It was not possible to clearly 
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elucidate the underlying memory change. However, the majority of participants 
experienced a sense of two memories existing following ImRs, with some participants 
experiencing something closer to change to the original traumatic memory. Multiple 
factors that moderated the effectiveness of the technique were also determined, in 
stages before, during and after a rescripting session. These included the theoretical 
codes of ‘factors preceding ImRs’, ‘individual differences’, ‘the importance of the 
therapeutic structure’, ‘the importance of the therapist’, ‘creating an effective 
rescript’, ‘long-term accessibility of the rescript’ and ‘enhancing on-going use of 
ImRs’, with multiple focused codes within these. A model is presented (Figure 2) 
demonstrating the ImRs process, including these potential mechanisms of action and 
effectiveness factors. Furthermore, this includes a feedback loop demonstrating the 
iterative nature of the ImRs process, with factors present after one rescript feeding 
back in and affecting the next, and so on. 
 
Research in this area is in its infancy and future research could consider examining 
the mechanisms of action and effectiveness factors of ImRs without the confounds of 
other therapeutic techniques, the implications of autonomous rescripting and the 
effects of rescripting more broadly in individuals’ lives. Importantly, and more 
closely linked to the research questions, future research could build on this study to 
further determine the mechanisms of action and clarify the links between those and 
the suggested effectiveness factors. It is hoped that by learning from those who have 
personal experience of the technique this study can increase the theoretical 
understanding of ImRs and in turn, increase future clinical effectiveness. 
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Appendix 5. Information sheet for participants. 
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Appendix 6. Extracts from research diary and memos. 
 
Research diary extracts 
15th and 16th of December 2015: 
I just attended a two-day training on ImRs with Arnoud Arntz with my team on 
placement. It was a really interesting two days, I feel lucky to have been there. It has 
made me more enthusiastic about the thesis and finding out more about the technique. 
However, I’m concerned now about how this knowledge could affect my thinking at 
all stages of the study: creating the interview schedule, during the interviews and at 
the coding stage. The amount of prior knowledge I have is quite different to Glaser 
and Strauss’ (1967) original ideas of how to conduct a GT study. My research 
supervisor suggested I read some of Harper’s (2013) thoughts on this, particularly 
‘concerns about the role of theory’. Harper suggested that if a researcher’s reading 
around an area is narrow there is the danger that analysis will be superficial. He 
suggested the important thing is to identify assumptions and trace the effects of these 
on the data. This was reassuring in regards to the idea of comparing the results to 
existing theories. Still, I should keep this in mind throughout the process and continue 
to discuss this in research supervision. How can I make sure I do not focus on these 
theories over other ideas? What are the best ways to guard against this influencing the 
results – reflect, make diary entries, re-check codes myself, cross-check codes with 
others? 
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29th of January 2016: 
I completed the first interview with P1 today. It feels great to have finally started the 
interviews and it was reassuring the interview schedule felt appropriate – length, type 
of questions and the questions making sense. I am worried though that sometimes P1 
seemed to be answering about TF-CBT more generally and not specifically about 
ImRs. This made me wonder if it is really possible to separate the two, particularly 
regarding what has created memory change? Perhaps a limitation of the study then is 
the confound that comes with all participants having undergone TF-CBT treatment 
before ImRs. Should future research replicate this study with those who have had only 
ImRs (like Arntz et al., 2013)? Would this demonstrate similar or different findings? 
 
Something else that I’m left thinking about is P1 feeling they needed to protect the 
rescript – I had not considered this before. Can rescripted images become ‘detached’ 
from the memory being rescripted and become more of a compassionate/nurturing 
figure? This could have many positives (being used more generally to alleviate 
distress and feel soothed) but also negatives too (the image develops feelings and then 
needs to be looked after rather than looking after the person in the memory). Explore 
this further with future participants? 
 
Also, this interview has made me consider the terminology I’m using more carefully.  
Interestingly, P1 viewed ‘rescripting’ as cognitive restructuring/updating techniques 
as well, which makes sense, and we had an interesting conversation about ‘knowledge 
rescripting’ and ‘imagery rescripting’. After all, ‘rescripting’ is a term created and 
used by therapists and I realised that I had been narrowly viewing ‘rescripting’ as 
ImRs only. I need to consider this carefully in future interviews, perhaps a clearer 
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definition of ‘imagery rescripting’ is needed? My research supervisor suggested to 
guard against being too prescriptive, but will people be left confused?  
 
Possible future areas to explore: Should questions regarding believability of the 
rescript be emphasised? Should questions regarding protecting the rescript be 
included? Should questions regarding effect on mood if cannot bring rescript to mind 
be included? 
 
Later note: Feedback on the interview suggested that a clearer definition of ImRs 
would be helpful. I had been ensuring this was clear at the beginning of the interviews 
since interviewing P1, however I will continue to make this clear. I do not feel that 
participants have been confused regarding what I am asking about however, so 
hopefully not detrimental to the results. 
 
18th of February 2016: 
I have just completed the interview with P3 and I continue to be struck by how 
emotive the interviews are turning out to be. P3 showed me various physical health 
issues due to the traumatic event and I am feeling quite emotional. I think I need to 
make it even clearer that I’m asking about the technique not the traumatic event itself 
and reiterate that we can complete the interview without participants telling me about 
the trauma. Is this possible for people though? I should also continue to reiterate that 
they can stop at any time, not answer any questions, and speak with therapists 
afterwards if necessary. I need to ensure I’m not falling into a clinical rather than a 
research role during the interviews, particularly when participants are distressed. 
These role boundaries can feel difficult to hold. 
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Transcribing this interview (same day): I need to be careful of the language I’m using 
when discussing what happens to the original traumatic memory representation. It is 
easy when thinking quickly in the interviews to use leading questions referring to 
“two memories” or “changing the memory”, for example, “do you think that that’s 
replaced, so the original memory has changed and been replaced a little bit or does it 
feel like there are two memories, the different ending and the old memory?” (P3, line 
519). This may be where my prior knowledge of theory is coming in to the interviews 
and I need to be careful of this. 
 
20th of March 2016 (changes to the interview schedule): 
Many participants are speaking of it feeling like there are two memories. However the 
original memory does feel less bad – is this due to rescripting though? Should we 
change the interview schedule to reflect this? For example, if participants do talk 
about two memories I could ask “when you are reminded of the traumatic event, 
which memory is stronger, the original or the rescripted?” It is difficult to ask 
questions to clearly ascertain underlying theories of memory however. Also it is 
interesting that the question “has there been a change in meaning of the original event 
for you?” is confusing for people/they do not like this question. Perhaps meaning is 
encapsulated in emotion change for participants generally – emotional meaning? I 
should talk to my research supervisors about removing this question as it does not add 
anything. 
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Memo extracts 
 
25th of February 2016: Raising initial codes to focused codes - Is practice needed? 
It strikes me that some participants are able to use rescripting outside of sessions to: 
1) rehearse the rescript and even 2) rescript new/change existing rescripts, both of 
which are increasing the effectiveness of ImRs. However some participants have been 
very clear they are unable to do this alone. It appears that practising rescripting 
outside of sessions (in various ways) increases effectiveness. So this raises the 
question, what are the factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of someone 
practising? Confidence, belief in ability (self-efficacy?), reliance on the therapist, 
previous successes, therapist’s instructions, nature of the trauma? Rehearsing the 
rescripts is perhaps less of a surprising finding that people actually rescripting 
autonomously outside of sessions. Is there research on rescripting autonomously? 
This makes me think of the saying “give a man a fish and you feed him for a day, 
teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime”. This fits with the CBT idea of 
homework. Could a rescripting diary be used? People could practise the one created 
in sessions, record, discuss, try again. Or even rescript something new. Is this 
advisable without the therapist there? Conversely, how does this fit with the idea that 
ImRs can make a powerful change to memories within one session? Has research ever 
examined the effects of practice on ImRs longitudinally? 
 
These ideas seem to be coming up within interviews and across interviews. Perhaps 
possible focused codes to be raised therefore are - ‘rehearsing the rescript’ and 
‘developing rescripting skills’? 
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11th of March 2016: Theoretical codes – Memory change mechanism of action 
Change to memory representations definitely feels like a theoretical code - it is central 
to peoples’ experiences, creates change in the process, and aids theoretical 
consideration. However, I have been thinking a lot whether the underlying 
mechanisms of memory change can actually be delineated in this study. I had an 
interesting conversation today with another trainee doing research in the same area 
about this. If a new memory had been created or if the old memory had been 
reconsolidated participants are likely to still be able to retrieve the old memory 
(Arntz, 2012). What would multiple trace theory say about this? 
 
So, I need to stick closely to participants’ experiences. Many participants feel as if 
there are two competing memories, which feels more in line with Brewin’s ideas, 
although I must remember it is not necessarily evidence for this. P5 definitely 
described a change to the original memory/rewriting/a part had gone/creating a new 
storyline, which felt like a different experience. It’s also easy to assume if a rescript 
comes automatically with the memory, the memory has been changed. However this 
could just be a consistently more automatic rescript? Could two memories become 
merged over time? 
 
Therefore, I think a theoretical code should address memory change and within that 
there should be a focused code about change to the original memory and one about 
creating a new memory to capture participants’ experiences. 
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8th of April 2016: Raising initial codes to focused codes – Metacognition? 
An idea that felt important in research supervision today was metacognition. This has 
been discussed in the interviews but is perhaps harder to ‘spot’ as participants are not 
explicit about this, a new sense of control over memories just comes through how 
they describe things. I need to be more alert to this and raise this as a focused code if 
the data supports it? 
 
An interesting idea discussed in supervision was the different levels of metacognition. 
Is it possible that metacognitively gaining control over the memories is linked to 
gaining control in the rescript itself and linked to gaining control in life more 
generally? I wonder if this has/will come through more in future interviews? The time 
constraints placed on the study make me concerned codes would occur if there was 
more time to saturate the categories fully. I will report what is evident from the 
interviews conducted and mention this in the discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
META 
“I have control over my memories 
and thoughts” 
NOW 
“I have control in life” 
THEN 
“I have control in this traumatic 
situation” 
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Appendix 7. Initial interview schedule. 
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Appendix 8. Adapted interview schedule with changes highlighted in red. 
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Appendix 9. Consent form for participants. 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 205	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
	 206	
Appendix 10. Information collected from therapists about participants. 
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Appendix 11. Summary of results and model sent to participants for feedback.  
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Appendix 12. Template of letter to participant’s General Practitioner. 
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Appendix 13. Extract of a transcript and initial and focused codes. 
 
Removed from the final electronic copy to maintain confidentiality. 
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Appendix 14. Detailed model of the effectiveness factors and mechanisms of action of ImRs. 
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Description of the detailed model: 
A simplified model is presented in the results (Figure 2) and a more detailed model 
presented here (Appendix 14). This model specifies the direction within each focused 
code that increased the effectiveness of ImRs (e.g., focused code 2.1, when 
participants had high levels of imagery ability this increased effectiveness). This 
model demonstrates that theoretical codes were linked to the effectiveness of ImRs 
generally, without specifying a mechanism of action (see green arrows). However 
participants also felt that certain theoretical codes linked to specific mechanisms of 
action (e.g., theoretical codes 8 and 9 linking to memory change) (see blue arrows). 
Participants also suggested specific focused codes linked to specific mechanisms of 
action (e.g., focused codes 4.2 and 9.2 linking to self-efficacy) (see blue arrows). 
Furthermore, self-efficacy was also found to influence on-going use of ImRs 
(theoretical code 9) (see blue arrow). Importantly, this model also demonstrated 
relationships between effectiveness factors (see red arrows). This was outside the 
scope of the discussion of this study, however these relationships could be viewed as 
‘mini formulations’ to consider during ImRs sessions. It should be noted that these 
relationships may have been discussed by one participant only and should be 
interpreted with this in mind.  
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Appendix 15. Table demonstrating the prevalence of codes in relation to each participant 
 
Theoretical Codes Focused codes Participants 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
Pre ImRs Session 
1. Factors preceding ImRs 1.1. Nature of the trauma memory 
 
 ✓ ✓       ✓ 
1.2. Attitude towards treatment and change pre 
ImRs 
✓    ✓ ✓ ✓    
1.3. Attitude towards the ImRs technique pre ImRs 
 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
During ImRs Session 
2. Individual differences 2.1. Importance of general imagery ability  
 
    ✓ ✓   ✓  
2.2. Ability to believe in the rescript  
 
✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2.3. Effect of mood  
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓   ✓  
2.4. Level of dissociation  
 
  ✓  ✓  ✓    
2.5. Level of motivation  
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓    ✓ 
2.6. Metacognitive insight (mechanism of action) 
 
  ✓  ✓  ✓   ✓ 
2.7. Level of self-efficacy (mechanism of action) 
 
  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓   ✓ 
3. The importance of the therapeutic 
structure 
3.1. Timing of ImRs in the treatment process 
 
✓ ✓ ✓       ✓ 
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3.2. Timing of the rescript in the memory 
 
✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓   
3.3. Viewing ImRs as part of a treatment  
package 
✓ ✓   ✓     ✓ 
4. The importance of the therapist  
 
4.1. Trust in the therapist 
 
    ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
4.2. Level of support and guidance with rescripting 
 
✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ 
4.3. Using the therapist’s presence in the rescript 
 
    ✓ ✓     
5. Creating an effective rescript 5.1. Level of agency in choosing the rescript 
 
  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
5.2. Optimal vividness 
 
✓  ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
5.3. Optimal perspective  
 
 ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
6. Felt sense change mechanism 
 
 
6.1. Changing emotions 
 
✓   ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
6.2. Changing feeling states 
 
✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
6.3. Completing behavioural urges 
 
✓  ✓ ✓   ✓  ✓  
6.4. Generalising feeling and behaviour change to 
general life 
     ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
7. Memory change mechanism 
 
7.1. Changing the original traumatic memory 
 
    ✓   ✓   
7.2. Creating an alternative better memory 
 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
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7.3. A change point in the memory 
 
        ✓ ✓ 
Post ImRs Session 
8. Long-term accessibility of the 
rescript  
8.1. Automatically accessing the rescript 
 
✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
8.2. Intentionally accessing the rescript 
 
✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
8.3. Change in accessibility and strength of the 
rescript over time 
 ✓    ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
9. Enhancing on-going use of ImRs  9.1. Rehearsing the rescript 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  
9.2. Developing rescripting skills 
 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓   
9.3. Using rescripting aids 
 
✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
9.4. Using the rescripted image more broadly 
 
✓       ✓ ✓  
9.5. Attitude towards the ImRs technique post ImRs 
 
   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ 
 
 
